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I. INTRODUCTION  
Alike many viral pathogens, influenza A viruses (IAV) are characterised by their constant evolution and 
subsequent emergence of novel strains (1). Over the past decade, IAV have been the elicitor of four 
pandemics and numerous epidemics, as well as having drastic impacts on the poultry and swine 
production sectors (2, 3). In addition to the pronounced bearing on the livestock industry, the zoonotic 
propensity of certain IAV strains poses a threat to public health (1, 4). Concomitant circulation of IAV 
in waterfowl, the natural reservoir of IAV, rapid adaptation to environmental changes and frequent 
spill over events into animal hosts and the human population upholds the advancement of novel IAV 
strains (5, 6). IAV can be classified depending on the host of origin, accordingly termed avian influenza 
virus (AIV), swine influenza A virus (swIAV), or elsewise conferring to the affected species (7, 8). 
Further, AIV of subtypes H5 and H7 can be divided into two groups according to the level of 
pathogenicity: Low pathogenic AIV (LPAIV) and highly pathogenic AIV (HPAIV) (9). 
Due to the broad diversity of IAV, surveillance by full genomic evaluation has become indispensable. 
In an outbreak scenario whole-genome sequencing (WGS) is utilised to identify the emerging, 
potentially zoonotic IAV (10). Thereafter, genetic characterisation of the novel IAV assists in the 
establishment of preventive measures. The nucleotide-level resolution of in-depth WGS permits 
phylogenetic analysis and molecular epidemiology studies to achieve a detailed understanding of the 
outbreak (11). Although WGS with expensive, stationary, slow and laborious second-generation 
devices produces high quality data, this thesis describes the establishment of a rapid, portable, 
inexpensive, real-time third-generation sequencing approach to improve outbreak response and WGS 
availability. In addition, application of the proposed protocol in a recent HPAIV H5 outbreak in 
Germany, 2020, is included in this thesis.  
The most widespread HPAIV H5 lineage emerged in 1996, affecting geese in the Chinese Guangdong 
province (goose/Guangdong lineage, gs/GD) (12). Aided by the global spread via migratory birds and 
unprecedented tendency for reassortment, a plethora of clades, sub- and genotypes causing high 
mortality as well as zoonotic strains have evolved from the respective H5 lineage (3, 13, 14). Since the 
initial detection of the first gs/GD HPAI H5N1 virus in Germany, 2006 (15), a recurring influx of 
reassortant HPAIV H5 subtypes including H5N1, H5N8, H5N5 and H5N6 in assorted genotype 
constellations have been identified (16-20). Recurring clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV H5 outbreaks have been 
repeatedly detected in Germany since 2016. The most severe HPAIV clade 2.3.4.4b epidemic was 
recorded in Germany during winter 2016/2017, affecting an unprecedented number of (commercial) 
poultry holdings and triggering high mortality in the wild bird population (18, 19, 21, 22). As curtailing 





precise understanding of the role of poultry in outbreak scenarios by phylogenetic analysis can aid in 
the establishment of prevention measures (23). The conducted in-depth phylogenetic analyses of clade 
2.2.3.4b HPAIV H5 outbreaks by WGS included in this thesis cast a light on the genetic relations, 
outbreak dynamics, and zoonotic propensity of the German clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV H5 2016 – 2020 
outbreaks.  
Likewise, the introduction of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5 viruses to Egypt in 2016 led to the emergence of 
multiple novel reassorted HPAIV (24, 25). Again, the utilisation of WGS for genetic characterisation of 
the novel strains allowed exact dissection of the genetic backbone and reassortment pattern (26), as 
described in this thesis. Due to the endemic HPAIV situation in Egypt, precise identification and 
classification of novel HPAIV H5 strains is of utmost importance (26, 27).  
 
Collectively, this thesis focusses on (i) the establishment and application of a rapid, portable, third-
generation nanopore sequencing workflow for IAV, (ii) molecular epidemiology, zoonotic potential and 
genetic evaluation of the 2016 – 2020 HPAIV H5 outbreaks in Germany, and (iii) the genetic 















II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Whole-Genome Sequencing 
Since the discovery of the structure of deoxyribose nucleic acid (DNA) in 1953 (28), a multitude of 
sequencing techniques have emerged. All pursuing the goal of obtaining the nucleic acid sequences of 
entire (viral) genomes, this process is now referred to as whole-genome sequencing (WGS). Knowledge 
of the full genome allows genetic characterisation, molecular epidemiology studies and classification 
of novel and known pathogens. 
1.1. Employment and Value of Sequencing in Viral Outbreak Scenarios 
A glance at the size and growth of the international nucleotide sequence database shows the integral 
role of sequencing in most scientific research applications, especially in the field of virology (29-31). 
Human history is abounding with viral disease outbreaks causing devastating repercussions for entire 
populations, for instance the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic (32) and 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic (33), 
the ongoing human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) pandemic (34), and the recent 2014-2015 Ebola virus 
(EBOV) epidemic (35). Highlighting the significance of viral pathogens, the 2019 annually reviewed list 
of diseases recommended for prioritised research and development by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) included seven viral diseases and an unknown, emerging disease yet to be discovered, “Disease 
X”, also most likely to be of viral origin (36).   
Although epidemiological methods (contact tracing, mathematical modelling) and molecular biology 
tools (genotypic and phenotypic methods) have successfully assisted in disease control, rapid 
identification of the causative agent of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases by WGS has 
become indispensable in outbreak scenarios (37, 38). Full genomic evaluation facilitates nucleotide-
level resolution, permitting phylogenetic and variant analyses to aid in establishing preventive and 
therapeutic measures (39, 40). 
In December 2019, reports of a novel respiratory disease in Wuhan, China, led to the detection of the 
first “Disease X” (41, 42). Rapid WGS allowed the identification and classification of the causative 
agent: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (42, 43). In addition to initial 
metagenomic identification of SARS-CoV-2, this pandemic has demonstrated the enormous capacity 
and importance of WGS to study emerging infectious diseases by tracing outbreak origin and drivers, 
establishing transmission chains and monitoring virus evolution (43, 44). In light of the SARS-CoV-2 
pandemic, the employment of rapid, accessible and inexpensive WGS techniques in outbreak scenarios 





1.2. The Era of High-Throughput Sequencing  
Before the era of high-throughput sequencing (also called next-generation sequencing, NGS), the first-
generation chain termination method by Sanger was primarily used for sequencing ventures (45). 
Here, incorporation of radiolabelled dideoxynucleosidtriphosphates (ddNTP) led to random chain 
termination during elongation. For the determination of the base order, the resulting fragments of 
varying lengths were visualised by radiography after electrophoresis on a polyacrylamide gel. 
Optimisation of the respective first-generation sequencing method involved different fluorescently 
labelled ddNTP to allow chain termination in one tube (instead of four for each radiolabelled ddNTP), 
and subsequent automated separation by capillary electrophoresis and optical detection of the bases 
(46).  
Although Sanger sequencing led to the discovery of many ground breaking sequences, including the 
determination of the first human genome (47, 48), the time consuming, expensive and laborious 
approach called for a second generation of high-throughput, accurate and low cost sequencers. 
Characterised by the simultaneous parallel generation of short sequences (reads), the first high-
throughput second-generation sequencer, the 454 Genome Sequencer 20 developed by 454 Life 
Sciences (now Roche), was introduced in 2005. The highly competitive field of second-generation 
sequencers led to the discontinuation of the 454 platform in 2013 due to dated technology, and today 
the Illumina (Illumina Inc.) and IonTorrent (Thermo Fisher Scientific) platforms dominate the second-
generation market (49).  
Independent of the executing platform, second-generation sequencing (SGS) comprises four steps: 
Sample preparation, clonal amplification, sequencing and bioinformatic analysis (50, 51). Initially, the 
originating genetic material (ribonucleic acid, RNA/DNA) is prepared for sequencing. While DNA can 
be directly employed, RNA must be transcribed into complementary DNA (cDNA) by reverse 
transcription. After random fragmentation of the DNA/cDNA (fragment size dependent on the 
sequencing platform, typically 75 – 500 base pairs, bp), known oligonucleotide adapters encompassing 
sequences essential for amplification and polymerase binding are ligated to the 3’ and 5’ termini. 
Clonal amplification is performed to boost the generated sequencing signal. Based on sequencing-by-
synthesis, integrated nucleotides are registered during elongation of the synthesised chain conferring 
to the template sequence. Contingent on the sequencing platform, the integrated nucleotides are 
detected by fluorescence signals (Illumina) or electric potential changes (IonTorrent) (52).  
Data processing (basecalling) of the amassed sequencing signals can result in billions of output reads 
per sequencing run. Due to the challenges of working with massive datasets, further bioinformatic 





combined to produce larger sequences) or map-to-reference (reads are mapped to a known reference 
genome) approach is utilised to achieve whole genome sequences (53, 54).  
1.3. Nanopore Sequencing Methods – Long-Read, Real-Time Sequencing 
Over the past 15 years, tremendous progress has been made in the development, employment and 
commercialisation of NGS, including the achievement of the US$1000 human genome and 1000 
Genomes Project (55-57). While short-read, second-generation sequencers revolutionised scientific 
research applications in terms of cost efficiency, throughput volume and speed, a demand for 
technologies producing longer reads in real time resulted in the advent of third-generation sequencing 
(TGS).  
Major differences between SGS and TGS lie in the longer read lengths (75-500 bp vs. dependent on the 
sample molecule length), lack of need for clonal amplification and single molecule sequencing (58). 
Pacific Biosciences (PacBio) introduced the first successful single-molecule real time (SMRT) platform 
in 2011. To date, the stationary, costly and large PacBio Sequel sequencer can achieve mean read 
lengths of up to 15,000 bp with 5 – 10 gigabytes (GB) of throughput per four hour run, but carries 
significantly higher error rates (10 – 15 %) than second-generation sequencers (<1 %) (58-60).  
A novel third-generation nanopore sequencer was introduced to the market by Oxford Nanopore 
Technologies (ONT) in 2014. Dubbed MinION, the pocket-sized, portable device is capable of producing 
long reads limited only by the length of the sample molecule and can produce up to 30 GB of data in 
48 hours. Alike the PacBio platform, the MinION struggles with high error rates (10 – 15 %) especially 
in homopolymer regions, although the rapid evolution of new chemistries and bioinformatic workflows 
has considerably reduced this value (5 – 8 %) and improved homopolymer basecalling (58, 61, 62).  
The foundation for nanopore sequencing was laid in the 1980s when the idea of sequencing a single 
strand of nucleic acid by employing electrophoresis to draw it through a nanoscopic pore in a 
membrane was born (63). It took until 2012 for the first successful sequencing reports, followed by the 
commercialisation two years later in a large-scale collaborative MinION Access Program (MAP) (62, 
63). For sequencing, a MinION Mk1B device is coupled with a flow cell and powered by USB connection 
to a computer/laptop. The flow cell contains multiple protein nanopores set in an electrically resistant 
polymer membrane. By setting a voltage across this membrane, an ionic current flows through the 
nanopores and nucleic acid strands are driven through the pores. The transition of nucleic acid through 
the pores disrupts the current and changes in pattern or magnitude can be measured and 
characterised. A sensor measures the ionic current several thousand times per second and relays the 
accumulated data to an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) microchip (Figure 1). Final data 





Figure 1. The MinION (Mk1B) sequencing device (15 cm in length, right) and flow cell (13 cm in length, right). 
Sequencing is performed by adding the sample to the flow cell. The DNA molecule passes through the nanopore 
(1 nm, top left) set in a channel (middle left), resulting in a change of current in the nanopore. The change is 
measured by a sensor and passed to the ASIC (1 cm in length, bottom left) (61). For permission rights see Chapter 
X, Supplementary Material, Permission for Reproduction.  
ONT have introduced a wide array of novel and improved products over the past years. To help with 
the large processing capacities needed for data acquisition and basecalling, the MinIT was introduced 
as a companion to the MinION Mk1B in 2018, carrying multiple threading graphics processing units 
(GPU), 8 GB random-access memory (RAM) and 512 GB solid-state drive (SSD), thus eliminating the 
need for a dedicated laptop. In 2019, ONT announced the MinION Mk1C. This sequencer syndicates 
the original MinION Mk1B and MinIT setup by combining the real-time, portable sequencing of the 
MinION with a powerful integrated compute (preinstalled basecalling and analysis software) and a 
high-resolution touchscreen. Additionally, two larger, stationary high-throughput sequencers are 
available: The benchtop GridION can run five flow cells at once (up to 150 GB of data) while the ultra-
high throughput PromethION device can run 48 flow cells at once to create up to eight terabytes (TB) 
of data, especially suitable for population-scale sequencing (62, 64). 
The MinION and GridION flow cells contain 512 nanopore channels (ASIC measurement notions), 
allowing the simultaneous sequencing of 512 independent DNA/RNA molecules. Each channel is 
connected to four wells, from which one well at a time can provide data. Every well can contain zero 
to several pores, ideally carrying one pore per well. Therefore, the MinION and GridION flow cells carry 
2048 wells – four wells for each of the 512 channels, and ideally 2048 pores with one pore per well. 
Conversely, some wells can carry no pores, several pores, blocked or damaged pores (Figure 1). Quality 
criteria by ONT call for >800 pores per new flow cell. The MinION and GridION flow cells are available 





one short reader head, the R10.3 pores carry a dual reader head and longer reading barrel. This 
drastically improves the read accuracy (achieving on average 95% accuracy), especially in 
homopolymer regions.  
As with SGS, the samples must undergo library preparation prior to sequencing. Dependent on the 
research aim, ONT offers 14 assorted preparation kits for whole genome or targeted DNA and RNA 
sequencing. The samples can be fragmented or directly employed to sequence direct RNA, cDNA, 
genomic DNA or polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplicons. All kits share the essential addition of a 
specific Y-shaped sequencing adapter with motor protein by end-ligation or transposase activity to 
allow docking and transit of the sample through the nanopore. To reduce costs and increase 
throughput, multiplexing is possible: The addition of known oligonucleotides (“barcodes”) to samples 
allows simultaneous sequencing of multiple libraries. Produced reads can later be allocated to their 
respective barcode based on the oligonucleotide sequence (Figure 2). Library preparation is much less 
time consuming than SGS protocols, with transposase-based kits allowing sample preparation in only 
10 minutes.  
Figure 2. Barcoding/multiplexing of samples. The addition of a known oligonucleotide sequence (barcode) allows 
pooling of samples for sequencing. Subsequently, assignment of reads depending on the barcode 
(demultiplexing) allows further analysis.  
At an initial cost of US$1000 for the MinION Starter Pack (including the MinION Mk1B, two R9.4.1 flow 
cells, one kit of choice and a flow cell wash kit), nanopore sequencing has become accessible and 
affordable for many research groups. Long-read technologies are enabling the exploration of genomes 
at an unprecedented resolution, allowing de novo genome assemblies, the determination of structural 
variants and insights into long-stretch repetitive sequences (65, 66). Additionally, unamplified direct 





Although the main asset lies in the production of long reads, the ability of real-time, portable and 
inexpensive sequencing are irreplaceable in outbreak scenarios. Deployment of the MinION to the 
International Space Station, the Canadian High Arctic and a working swine exhibition emphasises the 
versatility and portability of the device (69-71). Successful outbreak or surveillance sequencing has 
been conducted for inter alia, swIAV (71), Zika virus (72), EBOV (73, 74) und most recently, the SARS-






2. Influenza A Virus 
IAV are highly contagious, potentially zoonotic viral pathogens that cause subclinical, mild or severe 
respiratory disease (76, 77). The ability to adapt quickly to environmental (host) changes and the 
continuous circulation of IAV in waterfowl, the natural reservoir of IAV, with spill over events into 
several avian, animal and human hosts sustains the evolution of novel IAV strains. Alongside carrying 
the potential for (human) epidemics or pandemics, IAV are of utmost importance in the livestock 
industry, in particular the poultry and swine production sectors (1, 6, 77, 78).  
2.1. Taxonomy, Host Range and Classification 
IAV belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae (78). This family comprises six further genera including 
influenza B, C, and D viruses, Thogotovirus, infectious salmon anemia virus, and Quaranjavirus (79, 80).  
Depending on the host of origin, IAV can be classified as AIV, swIAV or other types of animal influenza 
viruses (7). Human, swine, equine, feline, canine and marine mammals have been reported to carry 
IAV, yet wild aquatic birds of the orders Anseriformes (ducks, geese and swans) and Charadriiformes 
(gulls, terns and waders) form the virus reservoir in nature (1, 81).  
IAV are highly variable. The antigenic variation based on the surface glycoproteins hemagglutinin (HA) 
and neuraminidase (NA) allows the theoretical classification into 154 subtypes, as eighteen subtypes 
of HA (H1 – H18) and eleven subtypes of NA (N1 – N11) have been identified to date (82). Subtypes H1 
– H16 and N1 – N9 have been described in waterfowl (78, 81, 82), while H17N10 and H18N11 have 
only been found in bats and fail to reassort with conventional IAV (8, 83).  
In addition to classification based on the antigenic properties of HA, AIV can be classified according to 
their pathogenic phenotype in chickens: LPAIV and HPAIV. The majority of AIV are LPAIV and cause 
mild or subclinical disease in birds. In contrast, two influenza subtypes (H5 and H7) have the potential 
to occur as HPAIV with up to 100% morbidity and mortality within a few days (9).  
In 1980, a nomenclature system for influenza viruses was established by the WHO (84). Included is the 
influenza type (A, B, C or D), host of origin (omitted for human-derived viruses), geographical location, 
strain or laboratory number, year of isolation and the HA/NA subtype (e.g. A/turkey/Germany-
NI/AI00334/2020 (H5N8)).  
2.2. Virus Structure and Genome Organisation 
Pleomorphic IAV particles are spherical (approximately 100 – 120 nanometres – nm, in diameter) or 
filamentous (over 300 nm in length) in shape (80). The IAV virion comprises a host-cell derived lipid 
bilayer membrane studded with HA and NA glycoprotein spikes in a ratio of four to one (Figure 3). A 





lipid envelope. Six internal proteins complete the virion, including polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2), 
polymerase basic protein 1 (PB1), polymerase acidic protein (PA), nucleocapsid protein (NP), matrix 
protein (MP) and non-structural protein (NS2) (1, 81). 
Figure 3. Structure of an influenza A virus particle (78). For permission rights see Chapter X, Supplementary 
Material, Permission for Reproduction. 
Orthomyxoviridae harbour a negative sense, single-stranded, encapsidated, eight-fold segmented 
ribonucleic acid (RNA) genome of approximately 13,500 base pairs (bp). All genetic information 
necessary for replication and assembly of progeny virions is encoded in the IAV genome (80). The eight 
gene segments of IAV are numbered in order of decreasing length, holding coding capacities for nine 
structural proteins (PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, M1, M2, and NS2) and up to five non-structural proteins 
identified in vitro (PB2-S1, PB1-F2, PB1-N40, PA-X, and NS1) (1, 6, 85, 86). Highly conserved regions can 
be found at the 3’ terminus (12 nucleotides) and 5’ terminus (13 nucleotides) of all gene segments. 
Partially complementary, the conserved regions form a short double-stranded RNA structure known 
as the “panhandle” and function as the promotor for viral RNA replication and transcription (87-89).  
Segments 1 – 3 encode the polymerase proteins: PB2, PB1 and PA. The PB2 protein is responsible for 





protein binds the 3’ and 5’ termini of viral RNA (vRNA) and complementary RNA (cRNA), initiating the 
process of genome transcription and replication. The role of the PA protein has yet to be fully 
dissected. The three described polymerase subunits form a heterotrimeric viral RNA-dependent RNA 
polymerase (RdRP) complex required for replication (Figure 3) (1, 80, 82, 90, 91). 
The viral surface glycoproteins HA and NA are encoded by segments 4 and 6, respectively (80). The HA 
protein is responsible for binding of sialic acids (viral host cell receptors) and fusion of viral and host 
cell membranes ensuing endocytosis (92). For activation of the HA protein, the initially synthesised 
single polypeptide precursor protein (HA0) undergoes posttranslational endoproteolytic cleavage into 
subunits HA1 and HA2 by cellular proteases (93). The NA protein, a sialidase, cleaves the sialic acids 
residue attached to newly produced virions, thus facilitating virus release (94).  
Segment 5 encodes the NP protein, responsible for binding vRNA with the amino terminus RNA-binding 
domain. Together with the heterotrimeric RdRP complex, vRNA segments coated in NP protein form 
the ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complex (Figure 3). The RNP complex plays a fundamental role in the 
transcription, replication and intracellular transport of vRNA as well as viral genome packaging into 
progeny particles (95).  
The MP protein, encoded by segment 7, includes the viral matrix structural protein M1 and the ion 
channel protein M2. A matrix of M1 protein encloses the virion core as a major structural component 
of the viral envelope. M2 protein forms a transmembrane ion channel to traverse the lipid envelope 
(96).  
Segment 8 encodes for two major NS proteins, NS1 and NS2. As an antagonist of interferon expression 
of infected cells, NS1 suppresses the host innate immune response and interferes with host gene 
expression. NS2, also known as nucleic export protein (NEP), plays a role in the nuclear export of RNP 
into the cytoplasm prior to virion assembly (97, 98).  
2.3. Genetic and Antigenic Viral Evolution 
IAV exhibit rapid evolutionary dynamics, irrespective of host range and viral subtype (99). Driven by 
large host populations, short generation intervals and high mutation rates, IAV pose the risk of 
zoonotic infection, host switch and the generation of pandemic viruses (3). Four human flu pandemics 
have been recorded over the past 100 years: 1918 H5N1 Spanish flu, 1957 H2N2 Asian flu, 1968 H3N2 
Hong Kong flu and 2009 H1N1 swine flu (3, 100-103). Although not classified as a pandemic, the HPAI 
H5N1 virus has caused more than 1000 deaths with mortality rates of about 55% since its emergence 





Ongoing viral evolution is expedited by three mechanisms: Point mutations (genetic drift), 
reassortment (genetic shift), and RNA recombination (104).  
Figure 4. Antigenic drift (point mutations) and antigenic shift (reassortment), demonstrated by the example of 
the pandemic human H3N2 virus from 1968 (78). For permission rights see Chapter X, Supplementary Material, 
Permission for Reproduction. 
Gradual evolution of the IAV genome results from high rates of synonymous and nonsynonymous point 
mutations (>1 x 10-3 substitutions per site, per year (99)), attributed to the error-prone RdRP activity 
and lack of a proofreading mechanism in IAV RNA replication (99, 105). Significant mutations affecting 
the major surface glycoproteins (HA and NA) can elicit antigen migration and result in new antigenic 
variants. This process is often referred to as antigenic drift (Figure 4). The host immune protection 
(neutralising antibodies acquired by previous infection or immunisation) might subsequently be no 
longer effective against the novel antigenic virus. Every mutation can potentially lead to evasion of the 






Due to the segmented genome of IAV, co-infection of one host cell with two varying parental influenza 
viruses (sub- and/or genotype) can result in the exchange of complete gene segments during virion 
assembly (Figure 4). Termed reassortment, the genesis of progeny viruses with gene segments from 
both parental viruses alters the genotype (107-109). Involvement of the HA and NA gene segments 
results in subtype change and differing antigenic properties, and is consequently referred to as 
antigenic shift. All four flu pandemics were linked to reassortant IAV of avian (1918, 1957, 1968) or 
swine origin (2009) (3). 
RNA recombination occurs in many RNA viruses, yet is rarely detected in negative-sensed, single 
stranded RNA viruses like IAV (110). Two main mechanisms of recombination can be distinguished: 
Non-homologous recombination between two different RNA fragments (111), and homologous 
recombination with template switching during virus replication (112). In China, the circulating zoonotic 
H7N9 AIV may carry a PB1 segment recombined with a highly pathogenic fragment from a HPAI H5N1 
virus, potentially the reason for the high fatality rate among patients infected with the respective H7N9 
strain (113).  
2.4. Highly Pathogenic and Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses 
AIV, also termed “bird flu/bird plague” was first described in poultry in Italy, 1878 (114). Aside from 
causing huge (economic) losses in both the poultry industry and wild bird population, some strains can 
carry zoonotic potential with the possibility of causing major worldwide pandemics as mentioned 
above. The classification of AIV into two pathotypes, LPAIV and HPAIV, can be achieved depending on 
the pathogenicity in chickens and the HA endoproteolytic cleavage site (HACS) (115).  
LPAIV are most frequently detected in the natural reservoir, wild aquatic birds, in a wild array of HA/NA 
subtype combinations and count for the vast majority of AIV. The widespread occurrence of LPAIV in 
(migratory) wild birds cause an asymptomatic infection course (116, 117). Sporadic transmission to 
gallinaceous poultry commonly induces either no clinical symptoms or mild disease. LPAIV infections 
with H7 and H9 are most frequently detected in poultry (118, 119). Although generally no clinical signs 
are visible, LPAIV play an important role in the reassortment and emergence of novel AIV, potentially 
carrying different antigenic and pathogenic properties (117).  
Of all HA subtypes, only subtypes H5 and H7 have the potential to evolve from LPAIV to HPAIV (1, 120, 
121). The classification of HPAIV builds on two conclusive characteristics: An intravenous pathogenicity 
index of >1.2 in chickens and a multibasic HACS (122). After infection of domestic poultry (especially 
chickens and turkeys) with LPAIV from the wild bird reservoir, host adaptation is believed to be the 
driver for the emergence of HPAIV variants (123). Initially, the HA protein stands as a single polypeptide 





HA2 by trypsin-like proteases found in the respiratory and intestinal tract. In contrast, HPAIV carry a 
polybasic HA0 cleavage site cleaved by ubiquitously expressed subtilisin-like cellular proteases, 
resulting in systemic viral replication and lethal infection with mortality rates of up to 100% in birds 
(93).  
  




2.5. Review: Genetics of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5 Viruses in Germany 
A conclusive summary of the genetics of HPAI subtype H5 viruses in Germany from 2006 to 2020 is 
presented here as a review publication. The reference section is presented in the style of the respective 
journal and is not included at the end of this document. The numeration of figures and tables 
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Supplemental Material  
Figure S1. Visual representation of proposed reassortment events for clade 2.3.4.4a HPAIV H5N8. 
Dashed lines indicate putative precursors. 
Figure S2. Visual representation of proposed reassortment event for clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV H5N8 
reassortant Ger-01-20. Dashed lines indicate putative precursors. 





Figure S3. Phylogenetic analyses of German clade 2.2 HA sequences done by Maximum Likelihood 
trees using RAxML with a bootstrap value of 1000 cycles. Trees include all available German clade 2.2 
HA segments from the 2006/2007 epidemic and reference strain A/bar-headed goose/Qinghai/3/2005 
(H5N1) for clade 2.2 (root) as designated by the World Health Organization. 
  




Figure S4. Phylogenetic analyses of German clade 2.3.4.4 HA sequences epidemic done by Maximum 
Likelihood trees using RAxML with a bootstrap value of 1000 cycles. Trees include all available German 
clade 2.3.4.4 HA segments from 2014 – 2020 and a reference strain for clade 2.3.4.4 (root) as 
designated by the World Health Organization. 
  




Table S1. Sequence identity (%) of respective index strains from the 2006 – 2007 HPAIV H5N1 epidemic in comparison to the top ten BLAST results, displaying 
one exemplary case per country and excluding other German cases (status as of 23.07.2020 on EpiFlu™).  
H5N1 German Index Strain Isolate ID  Corresponding Strains Identity level (%) 
Clade 2.2.1  A/pochard/Germany/R348/2006  EPI171706 A/Anas platyrhynchos/Slovenia/359/2006 99.88 
  EPI120044 A/common pochard/Switzerland/V592/2006 99.88 
  EPI14330 A/turkey/France/06222-1.1/2006 99.88 
  EPI231242 A/swan/Schaerding/1499/2006 99.88 
  EPI184079 A/goose/Hungary/14756/2006 99.71 
  EPI97191 A/bar-headed goose/Qinghai/62/05 99.35 
  EPI232420 A/whooper swan/Mongolia/244/2005 99.29 
  EPI45943 A/chicken/Nigeria/641/2006 99.29 
  EPI47200 A/cygnus olor/Croatia/1/2005 99.23 
Clade 2.2.2 A/Cygnus cygnus/Germany/R65/2006  EPI241681 A/peregrine/Denmark/6632/2006  99.94 
  EPI156821 A/swan/Poland/467-136V08/2006  99.88 
  EPI114800 A/goose/Krasnoozerskoe/627/05 99.71 
  EPI136605 A/Cygnus olor/Czech Republic/10814/06 99.65 
  EPI171691 A/chicken/Romania/3293/05 99.60 
  EPI101483 A/Cygnus olor/Astrakhan/Ast05-2-2/2005 99.48 
  EPI227150 A/duck/Novosibirsk/02/05 99.43 
  EPI171701 A/Ardea cinerea/Slovenia/185/06 99.26 
  EPI114798 A/goose/Suzdalka/10/05 99.15 
  EPI171687 A/peregrine falcon/Slovakia/Vh242/2006 99.04 
Clade 2.2 A/Cygnus olor/Germany/R1359/2007  EPI184642 A/mute swan/France/070203/2007 99.53 
  EPI132663 A/chicken/Kuwait/KISR8/2007 99.53 
  EPI126535 A/Cygnus cygnus/Krasnodar/329/07 99.48 
  EPI136631 A/Cygnus olor/Czech Republic/10732/07 99.31 
  EPI1780 A/whooper swan/Mongolia/2/06 99.13 
  EPI106728 A/grebe/Tyva/Tyv06-1/2006 99.08 
  EPI126212 A/chicken/Korea/CA7/2006 98.97 
  EPI225053 A/common gull/Chany/P/2006 98.91 
  EPI175729 A/chicken/Manshera/NARC10337/2007 98.86 
  EPI993179 A/chicken/Okayama/T6/2007 98.80 
 
 




Table S2. Sequence identity (%) of respective index strains from clade 2.3.4.4 and corresponding strains described in the manuscript, displaying one exemplary 
case per country and excluding other German cases (status as of 24.07.2020 on EpiFlu™).  
 
Clade Isolate ID German Index Strain ID  Corresponding Strains Identity level (%) 
Clade 2.3.4.4a EPI_ISL_167140 A/turkey/Germany-MV/AR2472/2014 EPI_ISL_169427 A/wigeon/Sakha/1/2014 99.83 
   EPI_ISL_167904 A/duck/England/36254/14 99.82 
   EPI_ISL_167905 A/chicken/Netherlands/14016437/2014 99.82 
   EPI_ISL_174398 A/mallard/Korea/H1924-6/2014 99.78 
   EPI_ISL_168025 A/duck/Chiba/26-372-61/2014 99.77 
   EPI_ISL_175534 A/mute swan/Sweden/SVA150311KU0277/SZ502/2015 99.73 
   EPI_ISL_177584 A/domestic duck/Hungary/7341/2015 99.72 
   EPI_ISL_169429 A/environment/Kagoshima/KU-ngr-H/2014 99.72 
Clade 2.3.4.4b       
Ger-11-16 EPI_ISL_237944 A/tufted duck/Germany/AR8444-L01987/2016 EPI_ISL_257699 A/tufted Duck/Switzerland/V237/2016 99.92 
   EPI_ISL_247713 A/tufted duck/Denmark/17740-1/2016 99.92 
   EPI_ISL_255209 A/common tern/Hungary/8187/2017 99.89 
   EPI_ISL_237921 A/wild duck/Poland/82A/2016 99.84 
   EPI_ISL_268678 A/T_Dk/NL-Zeewolde/16013976-005/2016 99.83 
   EPI_ISL_238895 A/chicken/Sweden/SVA161122KU0453/SZ0209318/2016 99.76 
   EPI_ISL_256298 A/gadwall/Kurgan/2442/2016 99.60 
   EPI_ISL_239801 A/turkey/England/052131/2016 99.55 
   EPI_ISL_247721 A/turkey/Rostov-on-Don/11/2017  99.54 
Ger-12-16.1 EPI_ISL_288746 A/mute swan/Germany-BY/AR857/2017 EPI_ISL_240012 A/duck/France/161108h/2016 99.82 
   EPI_ISL_255933 A/cormorant/Hungary/6102/2017  99.79 
   EPI_ISL_240104 A/chicken/Poland/79A/2016 99.74 
   EPI_ISL_309196 A/Buteo buteo/Belgium/3022/2017  99.69 
   EPI_ISL_250885 A/mute swan/Czech Republic/54-17_2/2017  99.66 
   EPI_ISL_238196 A/mute swan/Croatia/70/2016  99.64 
   EPI_ISL_387143 A/goose/Spain/IA17CR02699/2017  99.57 
   EPI_ISL_419350 A/duck/Bulgaria/Dobrich/407/2017  99.54 
Ger-12-16.2 EPI_ISL_240892 A/turkey/Germany-NI/R10523/2016 EPI_ISL_240102 A/domestic goose/Poland/33/2016 99.72 
   EPI_ISL_309195 A/Cygnus olor/Belgium/2967/2017 99.55 
   EPI_ISL_297234 A/chicken/Rostov-on-Don/1321/2017 99.52 
   EPI_ISL_257004 A/chicken/Czech Republic/206-17_2/2017 99.40 
   EPI_ISL_255174 A/goose/Hungary/65817/2016  99.35 




Clade Isolate ID German Index Strain ID  Corresponding Strains Identity level (%) 
Ger-12-16-N5.1 EPI_ISL_262056 A/greylag goose/Germany-NI/AR11353-L02142/2016 EPI_ISL_287565 A/M_Swan/NL-Groningen/16015826-001/2016 99.92 
   EPI_ISL_256462 A/mute swan/Hungary/5879/2017 99.85 
   EPI_ISL_255189 A/gadwall/Italy/17VIR133-2/2017  99.84 
   EPI_ISL_240101 A/mute swan/Croatia/102/2016 99.83 
   EPI_ISL_300746 A/swan/Poland/81/2017 99.75 
   EPI_ISL_256301 A/environment/Kamchatka/18/2016 99.54 
Ger-12-16-N5.2 EPI_ISL_260059 A/cormorant/Germany-SH/R896/2017 EPI_ISL_288411 A/Go/NL-Utrecht/17006881-001/2017 99.76 
Ger-12-17-N6 EPI_ISL_305453 A/chicken/Germany-SH/AR163-L02542/2018 EPI_ISL_332435 A/chicken/Netherlands/18000887-005/2018 99.67 
   EPI_ISL_291110 A/mute swan/Switzerland/V361-L02422/2017 99.58 
   EPI_ISL_292225 A/canada goose/England/AV58_18OPpoolEP1/2018 99.53 
Ger-01-20 EPI_ISL_404993 A/white-fronted goose/Germany-BB/AI00018/2020 EPI_ISL_405813 A/hawk/Poland/003/2020 99.83 
   EPI_ISL_402134 A/turkey/Poland/23/2019  99.83 
   EPI_ISL_419220 A/turkey/Hungary/1020_20VIR749-1/2020 99.79 
   EPI_ISL_418266 A/chicken/Czech Republic/1175-1/2020 99.61 
   EPI_ISL_405391 A/turkey/Czech Republic/3071/2020  99.61 














Table S3. Data acknowledgement – we acknowledge the following laboratories for providing sequences in the EpiFlu™ Database. 
Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_169427 A/wigeon/Sakha/1/2014 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR) 
EPI_ISL_167904 A/duck/England/36254/14 Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) 
EPI_ISL_167905 A/chicken/Netherlands/14016437/2014 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_174398 A/mallard/Korea/H1924-6/2014 Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency (S-2026) 
EPI_ISL_168025 A/duck/Chiba/26-372-61/2014 National Institute of Animal Health Japan 
EPI_ISL_175534 A/mute swan/Sweden/SVA150311KU0277/SZ502/2015 National Veterinary Institute Sweden 
EPI_ISL_177584 A/domestic duck/Hungary/7341/2015 Danam Vet Molbiol Hungary 
EPI_ISL_169429 A/environment/Kagoshima/KU-ngr-H/2014 Kagoshima University Japan 
EPI_ISL_257699 A/tufted Duck/Switzerland/V237/2016 Faculty of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Bern 
EPI_ISL_247713 A/tufted duck/Denmark/17740-1/2016 Technical University of Denmark 
EPI_ISL_255209 A/common tern/Hungary/8187/2017 Danam Vet Molbiol Hungary 
EPI_ISL_237921 A/wild duck/Poland/82A/2016 National Veterinary Research Institut Poland (PIWet-PIB) 
EPI_ISL_268678 A/T_Dk/NL-Zeewolde/16013976-005/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_238895 A/chicken/Sweden/SVA161122KU0453/SZ0209318/2016 National Veterinary Institute Sweden 
EPI_ISL_256298 A/gadwall/Kurgan/2442/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR) 
EPI_ISL_239801 A/turkey/England/052131/2016 Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) 
EPI_ISL_247721 A/turkey/Rostov-on-Don/11/2017  State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR) 
EPI_ISL_240012 A/duck/France/161108h/2016 Agence Nationale De Securite Sanitaire De L’alimentation (ANSES) 
EPI_ISL_255933 A/cormorant/Hungary/6102/2017  Danam Vet Molbiol Hungary 
EPI_ISL_240104 A/chicken/Poland/79A/2016 National Veterinary Research Institut Poland (PIWet-PIB) 
EPI_ISL_250885 A/mute swan/Czech Republic/54-17_2/2017  State Veterinary Institute Prague 
EPI_ISL_238196 A/mute swan/Croatia/70/2016  Croatian Veterinary Institute 
EPI_ISL_419350 A/duck/Bulgaria/Dobrich/407/2017  National Diagnostic and Research Veterinary Medical Institute Bulgaria (NDRVMI) 
EPI_ISL_240102 A/domestic goose/Poland/33/2016 National Veterinary Research Institut Poland (PIWet-PIB) 
EPI_ISL_297234 A/chicken/Rostov-on-Don/1321/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR) 
EPI_ISL_255174 A/goose/Hungary/65817/2016  Danam Vet Molbiol Hungary 
EPI_ISL_287565 A/M_Swan/NL-Groningen/16015826-001/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_256462 A/mute swan/Hungary/5879/2017 Danam Vet Molbiol Hungary 
EPI_ISL_255189 A/gadwall/Italy/17VIR133-2/2017  Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie 
EPI_ISL_240101 A/mute swan/Croatia/102/2016 Croatian Veterinary Institute 
EPI_ISL_300746 A/swan/Poland/81/2017 National Veterinary Research Institut Poland (PIWet-PIB) 
EPI_ISL_256301 A/environment/Kamchatka/18/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR) 
EPI_ISL_288411 A/Go/NL-Utrecht/17006881-001/2017 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_332435 A/chicken/Netherlands/18000887-005/2018 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_291110 A/mute swan/Switzerland/V361-L02422/2017 Institut für Virologie und Immunologie - Bundesamt für Lebensmittelsicherheit und Veterinärwesen 
EPI_ISL_292225 A/canada goose/England/AV58_18OPpoolEP1/2018 Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) 




Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_405813 A/hawk/Poland/003/2020 National Veterinary Research Institut Poland (PIWet-PIB) 
EPI_ISL_402134 A/turkey/Poland/23/2019  National Veterinary Research Institut Poland (PIWet-PIB) 
EPI_ISL_419220 A/turkey/Hungary/1020_20VIR749-1/2020 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie 
EPI_ISL_418266 A/chicken/Czech Republic/1175-1/2020 State Veterinary Institute Prague 
EPI_ISL_405391 A/turkey/Czech Republic/3071/2020  State Veterinary Institute Prague 








2.6. Circulation of Avian Influenza Viruses in Egypt 
The circulation of a wide variety of LPAIV and HPAIV in Egypt has led to the emergence of many 
reassorted AIV, of which many pose a serious poultry production and public health risk. Catalysed by 
lack of biosecurity measures in poultry production systems and high prevalence of backyard farming, 
the country constantly carries the threat of a major outbreak (27). To date, three major AIV lineages 
circulate in Egypt, including the HPAIV subtype H5N1 of clade 2.2.1 gs/GD lineage (2006), LPAIV 
subtype H9N2 of the G1 lineage (2011), and HPAIV subtype H5N8 of the clade 2.3.4.4b gs/GD lineage 
(2016) (24, 26, 124, 125).   
The first HPAIV H5N1 case in Egypt was reported in 2006 and the country was declared enzootic in 
2008 (126). The zoonotic potential of the circulating H5N1 strain has caused around 200 human cases 
with a mortality rate of 36% and remains a challenge for the public health of Egypt (127). The utilisation 
of vaccinations in both commercial poultry holdings and backyard flocks as a control measure was 
unable to stifle the spread of H5N1 and even enabled further mutation and genetic drift. As a result, 
two subclades (2.2.1 and 2.2.1.1) co-circulated from late 2009 through 2011. From 2012 onwards, 
clade 2.2.1.1 viruses were rarely detected, yet clade 2.2.1 viruses continue to circulate and evolve (124, 
128).  
LPAIV H9N2 of the Eurasian G1 lineage was first identified in 1966 in North America. Prior to the 
detection of LPAIV H9N2 in Egypt in 2011, the respective subtype had been circulating in Middle 
Eastern and Central-Asian countries from 1998-2010, of which many countries are now enzootic with 
H9N2 in poultry (129, 130). Although wild birds and poultry show no clinical illness, H9N2 viruses are 
capable of infecting humans and have traceably played a role in the genetic evolution of many zoonotic 
AIV (131). The co-circulation of H5N1 and H9N2 in susceptible host populations can increase the 
likelihood of the emergence of novel reassortant viruses carrying public health implications (132).  
Alike the extensive 2016-2017 HPAIV H5N8 outbreak in Europe, the same clade 2.3.4.4b reassortants 
reached Egypt in 2016 (133). Following the unprecedented tendency for reassortment of the 
respective clade, the probability of the generation of novel reassortant viruses, especially in a country 
with multiple co-circulating (zoonotic) strains, poses a great threat to the public health and poultry 
production sector. Since the introduction of HPAIV H5N8 in 2016, multiple novel reassortants have 















III. STUDY OBJECTIVES  
Objective I:   Establishment and application of a novel and rapid MinION nanopore sequencing 
workflow for IAV 
Publication I, III 
Due to the expedited evolution of IAV and the concomitant risk of novel antigenic and genetic, 
potentially zoonotic strains, rapid, accessible and real-time WGS is of utmost importance to aid in 
outbreak detection and surveillance studies. While the characterisation of emerging and re-emerging 
IAV has mainly been driven by SGS over the past decade, restrictive factors such as high costs, laborious 
protocols, expenditure of time and large, stationary equipment limit their application, especially in 
outbreak scenarios. Thus, attaining a real-time, rapid, portable sequencing system with the MinION 
third-generation nanopore sequencer to allow direct identification of potentially novel IAV strains 
builds and advances the foundation for IAV surveillance and detection.  
Objective II:  Genetic characterisation, outbreak dynamics and molecular epidemiology of clade 
2.3.4.4b HPAIV subtype H5 in Germany, 2016 – 2020 
Publication II, III 
Since the emergence of the H5 gs/GD lineage in China, 1996, the HPAIV H5 gene has evolved into a 
plethora of clades and genotypes, causing significant losses in the poultry industry, majorly affecting 
the wild bird population and influencing public health due to the zoonotic propensity of certain strains. 
Germany has seen a recurring influx of various reassortant clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5 viruses since 2016, 
a clade notorious for its unprecedented tendency for reassortment. With the help of WGS involving 
tools described under Objective I, the genetic characterisation, reassortant designation and temporal 
analysis of the occurring HPAI H5 viruses in Germany from 2016 – 2020 has permitted molecular 
epidemiology studies resulting in profound knowledge of the dynamics and relations of individual 
outbreaks. In addition, zoonotic risk assessment of IAV strains by the identification of genetic 
mutations linked to host adaptation can be achieved with WGS.  
Objective III:   Surveillance for the identification and genetic characterisation of novel reasssortant 
HPAIV subtype H5 circulating in Egypt, 2019 
Publication IV 
Co-circulation of multiple, partially zoonotic (HP)AIV lineages and the enzootic presence of H5N1, 
H9N2 and H5N8 in the Egyptian poultry sector has led to a wide variety of novel AIV by point mutations 
and, in more recent times, reassortment. Surveillance by WGS is of paramount importance to rapidly 





exact arrangement of reassorted segments and allow full genetic dissection of harboured segments. 
Publication IV targets the identification of novel reassorted HPAI H5 viruses collected in farms 

















IV. RESULTS  
The publications included in this thesis are grouped according to their topic and presented as a part of 
results section. The reference section of each manuscript is presented in the style of the respective 
journal and is not included at the end of this thesis. The numeration of figures and tables corresponds 






Results – Publication I: Rapid Multiplex MinION Nanopore Sequencing Workflow for Influenza A Viruses 
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Supplemental Material  
Table S1. Metrics of MinION and IonTorrent sequencing of twelve influenza reference samples, four human IAV samples and two avian IAV swab samples. 
Sample information ONT MinION IonTorrent S5 














R30-06 H1N1 RBK_01 135,319 76,779,158 567 12.4 IonXpress_001 979,254 263,435,070 269 27.5 
R3111-07 H2N9 RBK_02 124,950 57,837,095 463 12.3 IonXpress_002 789,774 219,019,649 277 27.3 
R2555-06 H3N1 RBK_03 127,224 47,715,460 375 12.4 IonXpress_005 896,250 249,270,903 278 26.8 
HAIV-81 H4N6 RBK_04 184,108 97,179,395 528 12.4 IonXpress_006 945,428 255,182,523 269 27.2 
R1612-08 H5N3 RBK_05 154,055 58,279,146 378 12.3 IonXpress_007 1,141,716 319,299,737 279 26.8 
R617-07 H6N2 RBK_06 155,749 66,775,697 429 12.5 IonXpress_008 584,795 166,306,709 284 26.6 
R11-01 H7N7 RBK_07 171,932 73,404,138 427 12.3 IonXpress_010 911,348 245,062,731 268 27.2 
R249-08 H9N2 RBK_08 127,146 47,167,977 371 12.5 IonXpress_011 991,208 272,905,748 275 26.9 
WV1677-03 H10N4 RBK_09 149,147 61,256,718 411 12.5 IonXpress_012 988,573 278,693,189 281 26.9 
R2675-06 H11N6 RBK_10 89,162 40,107,611 450 12.6 IonXpress_013 940,860 261,449,754 277 27.1 
R2613-06 H13N8 RBK_11 192,947 101,885,364 528 12.4 IonXpress_014 1,038,855 294,774,287 283 27.2 
Se-99 H16N3 RBK_12 56,207 27,001,365 480 12.5 IonXpress_015 988,802 266,418,429 269 27.2 
FM-47 H1N1  RBK_04 312,507 171,295,702 548 12.3 NA NA NA NA NA 
R1541-07 H1N1 RBK_05 310,449 187,350,645 603 12.4 NA NA NA NA NA 
H1N1-swl H1pdmN1 RBK_06 308,631 197,777,138 640 12.2 NA NA NA NA NA 
AR3343-17 H1pdmN1 RBK_07 390,993 234,193,266 599 12.5 NA NA NA NA NA 
AR780-17 H5N5 RBK_10 15,402 9,615,096 624 12.5 IonXpress_089 426,862 127,641,921 299 27.3 
AR1384-17 H5N8 RBK_11 79,149 48,446,910 612 12.3 IonXpress_093 426,540 134,969,178 316 27.0 
 




Table S2. Accessions numbers (ENA) of shard data under project accession PRJEB35098. 





R30-06 A/duck/Germany/R30/2006 H1N1 ERS4226848 ERR3822170 ERR3822188 
R3111-07 A/duck/Germany/R3111/2007 H2N9 ERS4226849 ERR3822171 ERR3822189 
R2555-06 A/duck/Germany/R2555/2006 H3N1 ERS4226850 ERR3822172 ERR3822190 
HAIV-81 A/unknown/unknown/HAIV/1981 H4N6 ERS4226851 ERR3822173 ERR3822191 
R1612-08 A/turkey/Germany//R1612/2008 H5N3 ERS4226852 ERR3822174 ERR3822192 
R617-07 A/turkey/Germany/R617/2007 H6N2 ERS4226853 ERR3822175 ERR3822193 
R11-01 A/turkey/Germany/R11/2007 H7N7 ERS4226854 ERR3822176 ERR3822194 
R249-08 A/avian/Germany/R249/2008 H9N2 ERS4226855 ERR3822177 ERR3822195 
WV1677-03 A/mallard/Germany/WV1677/2003 H10N4 ERS4226856 ERR3822178 ERR3822196 
R2675-06 A/dunnock/Germany/R2675/2006 H11N6 ERS4226857 ERR3822179 ERR3822197 
R2613-06 A/black-headed gull/Germany/R2613/2006 H13N8 ERS4226858 ERR3822180 ERR3822198 
Se-99 A/black-headed gull/Sweden/5/1999 H16N3 ERS4226859 ERR3822181 ERR3822199 
FM-47 A/Fort Mammoth/1/47 H1N1 ERS4226860 ERR3822182 NA 
R1541-07 A/Niedersachsen/14/07 H1N1 ERS4226861 ERR3822183 NA 
H1N1-swl A/Regensburg/D6/09 H1pdmN1 ERS4226862 ERR3822184 NA 
AR3343-17 A/Michigan/45/2015 H1pdmN1 ERS4226863 ERR3822185 NA 
AR780-17 A/turkey/Germany/AR780/2017 H5N5 ERS4226864 ERR3822186 NA 
AR1384-17 A/chicken/Germany/AR1384/2017 H5N8 ERS4226865 ERR3822187 NA 
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Sequencing and Data Evaluation 
RNA of influenza-positive samples was extracted by using Trizol LS (ThermoFisher Scientific, Waltham, 
USA) and QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany). Influenza genome segments were 
amplified with specific primers by using Invitrogen Superscript III One-Step RT-PCR with Platinium Taq 
(ThermoFisher Scientific, Waltham, USA). The reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR) amplicons were 
sequenced by Sanger or next-generation sequencing (NGS) as previously described (1,2). For NGS, 
fragmentation of the RT-PCR amplicons was done with a Covaris M220 Ultrasonicator (Covaris Ltd, 
Brighton, UK) applying a target size of 500 bp. The sonicated cDNA was used for library preparation by 
using IonTorrent Ion Xpress Barcode Adapters and GeneRead DNA Library L Core Kit (QIAGEN). Size 
exclusion of the library was done with AMPure XP Magnetic Beads (Beckman Coulter, Fullerton, USA). 
The libraries were quality checked by using High Sensitivity DNA Chips and reagents on a Bioanalyzer 
2100 (Agilent Technologies, Böblingen, Germany), quantized via quantitative PCR with KAPA Library 
Quantification Kit Ion Torrent (Roche, Mannheim, Germany), and sequenced on an IonTorrent PGM or 
S5 XL (Thermo Scientific), respectively. Raw sequence data were quality-trimmed and screened for 
adapter and primer contamination. Consensus sequences were generated with an iterative mapping 
approach by using Bowtie2 (v. 2.3.0) (3) in the Geneious software suite (v. 10.2.3; Biomatters, 
Auckland, New Zealand). Geneious software suite was also used for quality check and automatic 
annotation of the sequences. Strain details and epidemiologic information of the viruses sequenced in 
this study are given in Appendix Table 1. For network analysis, virus sequences of German high 
pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N6 viruses sequenced in this study (Appendix Table 1) were 
aligned by segment together with similar sequences from HPAI H5N6 strains aligned by using MAFFT 
(4) (scoring matrix 200PAM / k = 2, gap penalty 1.53, two iterative refinement cycles) receiving 8 
alignments, 1 for each segment. Phylogenetic analyses of these alignments were done by using RAxML 
(5) with general time-reversible plus gamma as the substitution model applying 1,000 bootstrap 
replicates, resulting in 8 bootstrap-supported phylogenetic trees. All 8 trees were imported into 
SplitsTree4 for network generation (SuperNetwork, using mean edge weighting, including Z-rule, using 
Equal Angle for weighted splits transformation, Convex Hull and greedily compatibility applied) (6). 
Maps were created by using ArcGIS Online (www.arcgis.com). Sequences for comparison were 
retrieved from the Influenza Research Database (www.fludb.org) and EpiFluTM Database 
(www.gisaid.org). We acknowledge the laboratories for providing sequence information via EpiFluTM 
listed in Appendix Table 5. Consensus sequences were published in the EpiFluTM Database under 





accession EPI_ISL_291109, EPI_ISL_291110, EPI_ISL_305453, EPI_ISL_305454, EPI_ISL_305455, 
EPI_ISL_306989, EPI_ISL_313226, EPI_ISL_313227, and EPI_ISL_322179. 
Dataset Selection 
The sequence dataset for the phylogeny were selected to include representatives of related strains 
from the epizootic 2016–2017 and from European and Asian H5N6 outbreaks 2017–2018. In addition, 
HPAI strains used in animal trials or isolated from humans and, for PB2 phylogeny, similar sequences 
from low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses are included. 
Animal Trial 
We tested a HPAIV H5N6 virus (AR09/18; A/common pochard/Germany-BY/AR09–18-L02421/2017; 
AR09/18) together with a different reassortant HPAIV H5N5 (AR425/17; A/turkey/Germany-
SH/R425/2017; AR425/17) in a ferret inoculation model. The animal experiments gained legal 
governmental approval through the ethics committee of the State Office of Agriculture, Food Safety, 
and Fishery in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (LALLF M-V: LVL MV/TSD/ 7221.3–1.1–023/13). All 
procedures were carried out in approved biosafety level 3 facilities. We inoculated 5 ferrets (including 
control animals) per virus subtype intranasally using 105.5 50% tissue culture infectious dose (TCID50) 
per animal of H5N6 AR09/18 (total 75 µL) or 106 TCID50 per animal of H5N5 AR425/17 (total 50 µL). 
Nasal washes were collected every other day from all ferrets to measure virus excretion by applying 1 
mL phosphate-buffered saline into each nostril. Analyses of viral RNA load from nasal washes and 
organ samples were performed exactly as described (7). Ferret serum samples taken preinoculation 
and at 14 days post infection were heat-inactivated at 56°C for 30 min and analysed by means of a 
commercial ELISA for the presence of antibodies against influenza A virus nucleoprotein (ID Screen 
Influenza A Antibody Competition ELISA Kit, ID-vet, Montpellier, France) according to the 
manufacturer´s instructions. Hemagglutination inhibition assays against the homologous antigens 
H5N5 and H5N6 were performed according to standard protocols (Commission, E. 2006/437/EC: 
Commission Decision of 4 August 2006 approving a Diagnostic Manual for avian influenza as provided 
for in Council Directive 2005/94/EC. Report No. ISSN 1725–2555, 16 [2006]). 
Strain details and epidemiologic information of the viruses sequenced in this study are summarised in 
Appendix Table 1. Phylogenetic analyses of segments were done with similar sequences as described 
above. The results are given in Appendix Figure 1. 
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Appendix Table 1. Strain details and epidemiologic information of the viruses sequenced in this study. 




A/tufted duck/Germany/AR8444/2016* H5N8 Germany Schleswig-Holstein Aythya fuligula 2016 Nov 7 (2) 
A/turkey/Germany-SH/R425/2017* H5N5 Germany Schleswig-Holstein Domestic turkey 2017 Jan 22 (1) 
A/common pochard/Germany-BY/AR09–18-
L02421/2017* 
H5N6 Germany Bavaria Aythya ferina 2017 Dec 28 This study 
A/mute swan/Switzerland/V361-
L02422/2017 
H5N6 Switzerland Kanton Bern, Erlach Cygnus olor 2017 Dec 18 This study 
A/white stork/Germany-NI/AR251/2018 H5N6 Germany Lower Saxony Ciconia ciconia 2018 Apr This study 
A/buzzard/Germany-NRW/AR279/2018 H5N6 Germany 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 
Buteo 2018 May This study 
A/chicken/Germany-SH/AR163-
L02542/2018 
H5N6 Germany Schleswig-Holstein Domestic chicken 2018 Mar 19 This study 
A/chicken/Germany-SH/AR164-
L02543/2018 
H5N6 Germany Schleswig-Holstein Domestic chicken 2018 Mar 19 This study 
A/duck/Germany-SH/AR165-L02544/2018 H5N6 Germany Schleswig-Holstein Domestic duck 2018 Mar 19 This study 






Domestic duck 2018 Aug 31 This study 
*Used in animal trial. 
 
 
Appendix Table 2. NA segment similarities (protein and nucleotide) for the N6 and N5 segment of virus 
A/common pochard/Germany-BY/AR09–18-L02421/2017 (N6) and A/turkey/Germany-SH/R425/2017 
(N5), respectively, compared with similar NA segments from low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses 
of different subtypes*. 
Segment Accession no. Name Protein identity Nucleotide identity 
N6 
MF694081 A/mallard duck/Georgia/9/2016 (A/H4N6) 457/470 (97%) 1411/1441 (97%) 
MF694113 A/mallard duck/Georgia/3/2016 (A/H4N6) 457/470 (97%) 1412/1441 (97%) 
MH135674 A/duck/Bangladesh/33676/2017 (A/H4N6) 452/470 (96%) 1351/1436 (94%) 
MH071489 A/duck/Bangladesh/24268/2015 (A/H10N6) 450/470 (95%) 1363/1446 (94%) 
LC121366 A/duck/Mongolia/405/2015 (A/H3N6) 450/470 (95%) 1329/1443 (92%) 
LC121262 A/duck/Mongolia/118/2015 (A/H4N6) 450/470 (95%) 1329/1443 (92%) 
KY635728 A/duck/Bangladesh/25891/2015 (A/H4N6) 450/470 (95%) 1356/1446 (93%) 
KY635782 A/duck/Bangladesh/26920/2015 (A/H3N6) 449/470 (95%) 1358/1447 (93%) 
N5 
KU9629324 A/common redshank/Singapore/F83–1/2015 (A/H9N5) 468/472 (99%) 1398/1418 (98%) 
KP285887 A/migratory duck/Jiangxi/31577/2013 (A/H10N5) 467/472 (98%) 1389/1418 (97%) 
EPI866833 A/duck/Aichi/231002/2016 (A/H6N5) 465/472 (98%) 1383/1423 (97%) 
EPI866951 A/duck/Fukui/181006/2015 (A/H12N5) 462/472 (97%) 1377/1423 (96%) 
KY635758 A/black-tailed godwit/Bangladesh/24734/2015 (A/H7N5) 463/472 (98%) 1386/1423 (97%) 
MF613702 A/shorebird/Delaware Bay/327/2016 (A/H10N5) 454/472 (96%) 1295/1422 (91%) 
MF613865 A/American black duck/Alberta/274/2016 (A/H10N5) 454/472 (96%) 1296/1422 (91%) 
CY240796 A/ruddy turnstone/New Jersey/UGAI16–1448/2016 (A/H10N5) 454/472 (96%) 1299/1427 (91%) 
* Typical amino acid markers that are known to support replication in mammalian hosts, for example PB2 627K and PB2 701N (8), are not present in the tested 
viruses and in the first clade 2.3.4.4b human isolate FuSa21099/17. The receptor binding site in the HA segments of the analysed viruses also indicated a preferred 
binding to α-2,3 sialic acids present in the avian respiratory tract. Furthermore, H5N8 AR8444/16 and H5N6 AR09/18 NS1 protein do not show a C-terminal PDZ 









Appendix Table 3. H5Nx-strains tested in the ferret animal model described in this study or in different 
animal models, and human H5Nx-strains, summarizing their abbreviation, names, and references for 
their evaluation of zoonotic potential with corresponding relevant genetic markers*.  




PB2 627 PB2 701 NS PBM Reference 
FuSa21099/17 
A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017 H5N6 QVNGQRG E D GSEV (9) 
EMW541/16 
A/Environment/Korea/W541/2016 H5N6 QVNGQQG E D ESEV (10) 
CTW555/17 
A/Common Teal/Korea/W555/2017 H5N8 QVNGQRG E D GSEV (10) 
MDK16/16 
A/Mandarin duck/Korea/K16–187–3/2016 H5N6 QVNGQQG E D ESEV (11) 
AR8444/16 
A/tufted duck/Germany/AR8444/2016 H5N8 QVNGQRG E D † (7) 
AR425/17 




H5N6 QVNGQRG E D † This study 
*HA, hemagglutinin; NS, non-structural protein; PB2, polymerase basic 2; PBM, PDZ binding motif. 
†NS PBM not present. Truncated protein. 
 
  















Lungs Heart Spleen Liver Jejunum Pancreas Colon Kidney Cerebrum Cerebellum M.O. Other 
Neg. 
control 
14 0 ND ND ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Neg. 
control 
14 0 0 0 ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ND 0 0 0 0  
H5N5 7 0 2 0 0 ND 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 oral mucosa, 2 
ovary, 3 salpinx 
H5N5 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ND 0 0 0 0  
H5N5 14 0 0 ND ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ND 0 0 0 0  
H5N5 14 0 0 ND ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ND 0 0 0 0  
H5N5 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ND 0 0 0 0  
H5N6 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ND 0 0 0 0  
H5N6 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ND 0 0 0 ND  
H5N6 14 0 0 0 ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 ND ND 0 0 0 ND  
H5N6 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ND 0 0 0 0  
H5N6 14 0 ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ND 0 0 0 0  
*dpi, days post infection; ND, not done; neg., negative; M.O., medulla oblongata; O.E., olfactory epithelium; R.E., respiratory epithelium. The distribution of influenza A virus matrix protein was semi-quantitatively scored as follows: 0 = no 
immunoreactivity; 1 = focal/oligofocal immunoreactive cells; 2 = multifocal immunoreactive cells; 3 = coalescing/diffuse immunoreactive cells.   




Appendix Table 5. Acknowledgment of laboratories providing sequences in EpiFluTM database*.  
Isolate ID Country Isolate name Submitting Laboratory 
EPI_ISL_282143 Italy A/goose/Italy/17VIR6358–3/2017 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale Delle Venezie 
EPI_ISL_289713 The Netherlands A/Great Black-backed Gull/Netherlands/1/2017 Erasmus Medical Center 
EPI_ISL_282141 Italy A/swan/Italy/17VIR7064–1/2017 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale Delle Venezie 
EPI_ISL_292223 United Kingdom A/mute_swan/England/AVP_18_001986/2017 APHA 
EPI_ISL_288410 The Netherlands A/Mute Swan/Netherlands/17017377–001/2017 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_288409 The Netherlands A/Mute Swan/Netherlands/17017367–012/2017 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_273847 Italy A/turkey/Italy/17VIR5878–3/2017 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale Delle Venezie 
EPI_ISL_287800 Taiwan A/spoonbill/Taiwan/DB645/2017 Animal Health Research Institute 
EPI_ISL_275433 Russia A/unknown/Tatarstan/94/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_275432 Russia A/unknown/Tatarstan/86/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_275288 Russia A/chicken/Tatarstan/88/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_287907 The Netherlands A/Duck/Netherlands/17017237–001–005/2017 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_287906 The Netherlands A/Duck/Netherlands/17017236–001–005/2017 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_292225 United Kingdom A/canada_goose/England/AV58_18OPpoolEP1/2018 APHA 
EPI_ISL_288412 The Netherlands A/Tufted Duck/Netherlands/17017367–007/2017 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_289714 The Netherlands A/Black-headed Gull/Netherlands/29/2017 Erasmus Medical Center 
EPI_ISL_297235 Russia A/chicken/Rostov-on-Don/1598/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_297234 Russia A/chicken/Rostov-on-Don/1321/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_291109 Germany A/common_pochard/Germany-BY/AR09–18-L02421/2017 Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut 
EPI_ISL_292224 United Kingdom A/pochard_duck/England/AVP_18_003254/2018 APHA 
EPI_ISL_312376 Georgia A/Armenian Gull/Republic of Georgia/4/2017 National Center for Disease Control and Public Health, Georgia 
EPI_ISL_289713 The Netherlands A/Great Black-backed Gull/Netherlands/1/2017 Erasmus Medical Center 
EPI_ISL_304404 China A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017 Fujian Provincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
EPI_ISL_288437 South Korea A/duck/Korea/HD1/2017 Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency (O-2144) 
EPI_ISL_288436 South Korea A/mallard/Korea/Jeju-H24/2017 Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency (O-2144) 
EPI_ISL_305417 The Netherlands A/Domestic_Duck/Netherlands/EMC-6/2018 Erasmus Medical Center 
EPI_ISL_305416 The Netherlands A/Domestic_Duck/Netherlands/EMC-2/2018 Erasmus Medical Center 
EPI_ISL_303520 Georgia A/Mallard/Republic of Georgia/1/2018 National Center for Disease Control and Public Health, Georgia 
EPI_ISL_268665 The Netherlands A/Mal/NL-Mastenbroek/16015378–002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268669 The Netherlands A/T_Dk/NL-Monnickendam/16013865–006–008/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_303643 South Korea A/Mandarin_duck/Korea/K18–3/2018 Avian Diseases Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, Konkuk University 
EPI_ISL_303642 South Korea A/Mandarin_duck/Korea/K17–1896/2017 Avian Diseases Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, Konkuk University 




Isolate ID Country Isolate name Submitting Laboratory 
EPI_ISL_303641 South Korea A/Mandarin_duck/Korea/K17–1894/2017 Avian Diseases Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, Konkuk University 
EPI_ISL_303640 South Korea A/Mandarin_duck/Korea/K17–1893/2017 Avian Diseases Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, Konkuk University 
EPI_ISL_303639 South Korea A/Mandarin_duck/Korea/K17–1891/2017 Avian Diseases Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, Konkuk University 
EPI_ISL_303638 South Korea A/Mandarin_duck/Korea/K17–1889/2017 Avian Diseases Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, Konkuk University 
EPI_ISL_303637 South Korea A/Mandarin_duck/Korea/K17–1887/2017 Avian Diseases Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, Konkuk University 
EPI_ISL_238148 South Korea A/Mandarin_duck/Korea/K16–187–3/2016 Avian Diseases Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, Konkuk University 
EPI_ISL_288364 Greece A/chicken/Greece/39_2017b/2017 TVC 
EPI_ISL_288363 Greece A/chicken/Greece/39_2017a/2017 TVC 
EPI_ISL_288362 Greece A/chicken/Greece/39_2017/2017 TVC 
EPI_ISL_239393 Japan A/duck/Aichi/231002/2016 National Institute of Animal Health 
EPI_ISL_239416 Japan A/duck/Fukui/181006/2015 National Institute of Animal Health 
EPI_ISL_224753 The Netherlands A/chicken/Netherlands/15007212/15 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_294779 France A/duck/France/160051/2016 ANSES 
EPI_ISL_294778 France A/duck/France/160056/2016 ANSES 
*ANSES, Agence Nationale de Securite Sanitaire de l’Alimentation, de l’Environnement et du Travail; APHA, Animal and Plant Health Agency; TVC, Thessalonica Veterinary Centre. 






Appendix Figure 1. Phylogenetic analyses of PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, MP, and NS genes from H5Nx 
viruses done by Maximum Likelihood using RAxML. Bootstrap values of 1,000 cycles >50 are included. 
Scale bars indicate nucleotide substitutions per site. Reassortants are grouped according to 
phylogenetic results and shown to the right. Stars indicate strains tested in the ferret animal model 





described in this and a previous study (green stars), strains tested in different animal models (white 
stars), and human strains (white stars). H5N6 viruses analysed in this study are labelled in different 
colours according to their clusters (see legend). The reassortants H5N8 and H5N5 Germany are 
described in detail in (1). HA, hemagglutinin; MP, matrix protein; NA, neuraminidase; NP, 
nucleoprotein; NS, non-structural protein; PA, polymerase acidic protein; PB1, polymerase basic 
protein 1; PB2, polymerase basic protein 2. 






Appendix Figure 2. Histopathological findings in the H5N5-infected ferret necropsied at 7 days post 
infection (dpi). A, C, E, G) Hematoxylin eosin. B, D, F, H) Influenza A virus-matrix protein 
immunohistochemistry, avidin-biotin-peroxidase complex method, with a monoclonal mouse anti-
influenza A virus (strain PR8, A/PR/8/34(H1N1))-matrix protein immunoglobulin G1 containing 





hybridoma supernatant (clone M2–1C6–4R3, ATCC HB-64; American Type Culture Collection, 
Manassas, USA), 3-amino-9-ethyl-carbazol as chromogen and hematoxylin counterstain. A) Nasal 
cavity, olfactory mucosa. Mild, focal, subacute, necrotizing rhinitis with degeneration and loss of the 
olfactory epithelium (asterisk). B) Nasal cavity, olfactory mucosa. Abundant intensely influenza matrix 
protein immunoreactive cells and cellular debris within the lesion. C) Lung, bronchioles. Moderate, 
oligofocal, subacute, necrotizing bronchitis with luminal debris accumulation (asterisk). D) Lung, 
bronchus. A characteristic bronchial epithelial cell with intense pancellular influenza matrix protein 
expression (arrow). E) Lung, bronchiolus. There is intensely influenza matrix protein immunoreactive 
cellular debris (arrow) within the lumen of the collapsed and necrotic bronchioles. F) Liver. Moderate, 
multifocal, subacute, necrotizing hepatitis with infiltrating macrophages, neutrophils, and rare 
Councilman Corpuscles (arrow). G) Liver. Multifocal intensely influenza matrix protein immunoreactive 
intralesional debris (arrow) and fewer hepatocytes (arrowhead). H) Uterine tube. Severe, diffuse, 
acute, necrotizing salpingitis with nearly complete loss of mucosal epithelium and luminal debris 
accumulation (asterisk). I) Uterine tube. Multiple influenza matrix protein immunoreactive epithelial 
cells (arrow) and debris in luminal recesses in the lamina propria. A–C, F–I) Bar = 20 μm. D, E) Bar = 10 
μm.  









Novel HPAIV H5N8 Reassortant (Clade 2.3.4.4b) Detected in Germany 
 
Jacqueline King1, Christoph Schulze2, Andreas Engelhardt2, Andreas Hlinak2, Sara-Lisa Lennermann3, 
Kerstin Rigbers3, Jasmin Skuballa3, Christoph Staubach4, Thomas C. Mettenleiter5, Timm Harder1, 




1 Institute of Diagnostic Virology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald – Insel Riems, Germany  
2 Landeslabor Berlin-Brandenburg, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany  
3 Chemisches und Veterinäruntersuchungsamt Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, Germany  
4 Institute of Epidemiology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald – Insel Riems, Germany 


























































Figure S1. Phylogenetic analyses of PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, MP and NS sequences done by Maximum 
Likelihood trees using RAxML with a bootstrap value of 1000 cycles. Trees include the novel reassortant 
Ger-01-20 (A/white-fronted goose/Germany-BB/AI00018/2020 (root) and A/chicken/Germany-
BW/AI00049/2020 – both in blue lettering), and 100 closest relatives according to sequence identity. 
The red segments cluster with the Ger-01-20 reassortant, all originating in Eastern Europe (Poland and 
the Czech Republic) from December 2019 – January 2020. The dark green segments pinpoint the HPAIV 
H5N8 >10-2016 (Nigeria, Korea, India, South Africa) reassortant, while the orange marked sequences 
stand for the LPAIV H3N8 (Russia, > Aug 2017). 
  









Table S1. Sequence identity (%) of A/white-fronted goose/Germany-BB/AI00018/2020 in comparison 
to the top ten Blast results (executed on the GISAID Platform – 13.02.2020).  
 ID Name Subtype Collection Date Sequence Identity % 
PB2 EPI_ISL_405813 A/hawk/Poland/003/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-06 99.96 
 EPI_ISL_402134 A/turkey/Poland/23/2019 H5N8 2019-Dec-30 99.93 
 EPI_ISL_410291 A/chicken/Germany-BW/AI00049/2020 H5N8 2020-Feb-07 99.78 
 EPI_ISL_405391 A/chicken/Czech Republic/1175-1/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-17 99.61 
 EPI_ISL_405278 A/guinea fowl/Nigeria/OG-GF11T 19VIR8424-7/2019 H5N8 2019-Jul-05 98.86 
 EPI_ISL_237554 A/painted stork/India/10CA03/2016 H5N8 2016-Oct-20 97.65 
 EPI_ISL_240677 A/domestic duck/Siberia/103/2016 H5N8 2016-Oct-04 97.58 
 EPI_ISL_250231 A/domestic duck/Siberia/49 feather/2016 H5N8 2016-Jan-01 97.58 
 EPI_ISL_267135 A/green-winged teal/Egypt/871/2016 H5N8 2016-Dec-08 97.56 
 EPI_ISL_224580 A/great crested grebe/Uvs-Nuur Lake/341/2016 H5N8 2016-May-25 97.50 
 EPI_ISL_237553 A/duck/India/10CA01/2016 H5N8 2016-Oct-17 97.50 
PB1 EPI_ISL_402134 A/turkey/Poland/23/2019 H5N8 2019-Dec-30 99.83 
 EPI_ISL_405813 A/hawk/Poland/003/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-06 99.82 
 EPI_ISL_405391 A/chicken/Czech Republic/1175-1/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-17 99.61 
 EPI_ISL_410291 A/chicken/Germany-BW/AI00049/2020 H5N8 2020-Feb-07 99.46 
 EPI_ISL_355938 A/green sandpiper/Kurgan/1050/2018 H3N8 2018-Aug-26 99.01 
 EPI_ISL_331307 A/teal/Dagestan/1017/2018 H12N5 2018-Jan-23 98.72 
 EPI_ISL_250237 A/mallard/Chany/355/2016 H1N1 2016-Oct-10 98.71 
 EPI_ISL_250236 A/gadwall/Chany/315/2016 H1N1 2016-Oct-10 98.71 
 EPI_ISL_250235 A/mallard/Chany/313/2016 H1N1 2016-Oct-10 98.71 
 EPI_ISL_328976 A/mallard duck/Georgia/10/2016 H7N7 2016-Sep-30 98.66 
 EPI_ISL_250238 A/gadwall/Chany/97/2016 H6N8 2016-Sep-10 98.62 
PA EPI_ISL_410291 A/chicken/Germany-BW/AI00049/2020 H5N8 2020-Feb-07 99.77 
 EPI_ISL_405813 A/hawk/Poland/003/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-06 99.72 
 EPI_ISL_402134 A/turkey/Poland/23/2019 H5N8 2019-Dec-30 99.72 
 EPI_ISL_405391 A/chicken/Czech Republic/1175-1/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-17 99.55 
 EPI_ISL_405278 A/guinea fowl/Nigeria/OG-GF11T 19VIR8424-7/2019 H5N8 2019-Jul-05 98.98 
 EPI_ISL_378312 A/Domestic goose/South Africa/17090065/2017 H5N8 2017-Sep-04 98.51 
 EPI_ISL_369355 A/chicken/South Africa/448475/2017 H5N8 2017-Sep-12 98.51 
 EPI_ISL_369339 A/chicken/South Africa/440638A/2017 H5N8 2017-Aug-01 98.51 
 EPI_ISL_369336 A/chicken/South Africa/Villiers/2017 H5N8 2017-Jun-19 98.51 
 EPI_ISL_285657 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/08 0561 P2/2017 H5N8 2017-Aug-29 98.50 
 EPI_ISL_285648 A/Geese/South Africa/S2017/09 0055 P1/2017 H5N8 2017-Sep-04 98.50 
HA EPI_ISL_405813 A/hawk/Poland/003/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-06 100.00 
 EPI_ISL_402134 A/turkey/Poland/23/2019 H5N8 2019-Dec-30 100.00 
 EPI_ISL_410291 A/chicken/Germany-BW/AI00049/2020 H5N8 2020-Feb-07 99.60 
 EPI_ISL_405391 A/chicken/Czech Republic/1175-1/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-17 99.54 
 EPI_ISL_405278 A/guinea fowl/Nigeria/OG-GF11T 19VIR8424-7/2019 H5N8 2019-Jul-05 99.06 
 EPI_ISL_381815 A/dove/South Africa/17080324/2017 H5N8 2017-Aug-18 98.42 
 EPI_ISL_381813 A/Guinea fowl/South Africa/17080243/2017 H5N8 2017-Aug-16 98.42 
 EPI_ISL_378311 A/pigeon/South Africa/17080323/2017 H5N8 2017-Aug-18 98.42 
 EPI_ISL_369359 A/chicken/South Africa/449418/2017 H5N8 2017-Sep-18 98.42 
 EPI_ISL_369351 A/chicken/South Africa/17080581/2017 H5N8 2017-Aug-30 98.42 
 EPI_ISL_369348 A/Pekin duck/South Africa/17080481/2017 H5N8 2017-Aug-24 98.42 
NP EPI_ISL_410291 A/chicken/Germany-BW/AI00049/2020 H5N8 2020-Feb-07 99.81 
 EPI_ISL_405813 A/hawk/Poland/003/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-06 99.79 
 EPI_ISL_405391 A/chicken/Czech Republic/1175-1/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-17 99.57 
 EPI_ISL_387968 A/teal/Egypt/MB-D-487OP/2016 H7N3 2016-Jan-28 98.51 
 EPI_ISL_333615 A/gadwall/Chany/893/2018 H3N8 2018-Oct-19 98.51 
 EPI_ISL_387971 A/teal/Egypt/MB-D-621C/2016 H7N9 2016-Feb-11 98.44 
 EPI_ISL_387967 A/pintail/Egypt/MB-D-384C/2015 H3N6 2015-Oct-26 98.25 
 EPI_ISL_387135 A/duck/Egypt/N13736E/2017 H5N8 2017-Feb-15 97.99 
 EPI_ISL_344527 A/Duck/Egypt/AR518/2017 H5N8 2017-Mar-08 97.99 
 EPI_ISL_387137 A/chicken/Egypt/Q13804A/2017 H5N8 2017-Jan-03 97.92 




 ID Name Subtype Collection Date Sequence Identity % 
 EPI_ISL_189700 A/mallard/Republic of Georgia/13/2011 H6N2 2011-Nov-26 97.84 
NA EPI_ISL_402134 A/turkey/Poland/23/2019 H5N8 2019-Dec-30 99.68 
 EPI_ISL_405813 A/hawk/Poland/003/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-06 99.58 
 EPI_ISL_410291 A/chicken/Germany-BW/AI00049/2020 H5N8 2020-Feb-07 99.55 
 EPI_ISL_405391 A/chicken/Czech Republic/1175-1/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-17 99.47 
 EPI_ISL_250231 A/domestic duck/Siberia/49 feather/2016 H5N8 2016-Jan-01 98.56 
 EPI_ISL_237554 A/painted stork/India/10CA03/2016 H5N8 2016-Oct-20 98.50 
 EPI_ISL_254725 A/chicken/Korea/H903/2017 H5N8 2017-Feb-08 98.49 
 EPI_ISL_387133 A/chicken/Zimbabwe/AI4935/2017 H5N8 2017-May-25 98.48 
 EPI_ISL_292495 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/B11/2016 H5N8 2016-May-15 98.48 
 EPI_ISL_240677 A/domestic duck/Siberia/103/2016 H5N8 2016-Oct-04 98.43 
MP EPI_ISL_410291 A/chicken/Germany-BW/AI00049/2020 H5N8 2020-Feb-07 100.00 
 EPI_ISL_405813 A/hawk/Poland/003/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-06 100.00 
 EPI_ISL_402134 A/turkey/Poland/23/2019 H5N8 2019-Dec-30 100.00 
 EPI_ISL_405391 A/chicken/Czech Republic/1175-1/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-17 99.90 
 EPI_ISL_369345 A/chicken/South Africa/443397/2017 H5N8 2017-Aug-17 99.59 
 EPI_ISL_267135 A/green-winged teal/Egypt/871/2016 H5N8 2016-Dec-08 99.50 
 EPI_ISL_250231 A/domestic duck/Siberia/49 feather/2016 H5N8 2016-Jan-01 99.50 
 EPI_ISL_240677 A/domestic duck/Siberia/103/2016 H5N8 2016-Oct-04 99.50 
 EPI_ISL_254745 A/mallard duck/Korea/WA137/2017 H5N8 2017-Jan-24 99.50 
 EPI_ISL_388773 A/little grebe/Egypt/1056OP/2016 H5N8 2016-Dec-28 99.49 
 EPI_ISL_266421 A/common teal/Korea/W555/2017 H5N8 2017-Jan-04 99.49 
NS EPI_ISL_410291 A/chicken/Germany-BW/AI00049/2020 H5N8 2020-Feb-07 99.83 
 EPI_ISL_405813 A/hawk/Poland/003/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-06 99.76 
 EPI_ISL_402134 A/turkey/Poland/23/2019 H5N8 2019-Dec-30 99.64 
 EPI_ISL_405391 A/chicken/Czech Republic/1175-1/2020 H5N8 2020-Jan-17 99.53 
 EPI_ISL_405278 A/guinea fowl/Nigeria/OG-GF11T 19VIR8424-7/2019 H5N8 2019-Jul-05 99.16 
 EPI_ISL_237553 A/duck/India/10CA01/2016 H5N8 2016-Oct-17 98.61 
 EPI_ISL_231685 A/black-headed gull/Tyva/41/2016 H5N8 2016-May-25 98.61 
 EPI_ISL_231684 A/wild duck/Tyva/35/2016 H5N8 2016-May-25 98.61 
 EPI_ISL_230820 A/great crested grebe/Tyva/34/2016 H5N8 2016-May-25 98.61 
 EPI_ISL_292194 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a88/2016 H5N8 2016-May-12 98.60 
 EPI_ISL_266820 A/Bean goose/Hubei/CH-i122/2017 H5N8 2017-Feb-24 98.60 
 
  




Table S2. Data acknowledgement – We acknowledge the following laboratories for providing sequences in the EpiFluTM Database.  
Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_355938 A/green sandpiper/Kurgan/1050/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_355937 A/green sandpiper/Kurgan/1048/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_355936 A/green sandpiper/Kurgan/1046/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_355935 A/green sandpiper/Kurgan/1043/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_250237 A/mallard/Chany/355/2016 Research Institute of Experimental and Clinical Medicine 
EPI_ISL_250236 A/gadwall/Chany/315/2016 Research Institute of Experimental and Clinical Medicine 
EPI_ISL_250235 A/mallard/Chany/313/2016 Research Institute of Experimental and Clinical Medicine 
EPI_ISL_250238 A/gadwall/Chany/97/2016 Research Institute of Experimental and Clinical Medicine 
EPI_ISL_331306 A/shoveler/Ubinskoe Lake/43/2017 Research Institute of Experimental and Clinical Medicine 
EPI_ISL_331307 A/teal/Dagestan/1017/2018 Research Institute of Experimental and Clinical Medicine 
EPI_ISL_167226 A/Seal/Sweden/SVA0546/2014 National Veterinary Institute, Uppsala, Sweden 
EPI_ISL_285657 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/08 0561 P2/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285648 A/Geese/South Africa/S2017/09 0055 P1/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_378312 A/Domestic goose/South Africa/17090065/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369355 A/chicken/South Africa/448475/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285601 A/Geese/South Africa/S2017/09 0065 P1/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285611 A/Wildbirds Guineafowl Makou Egyptian Geese/South Africa/S2017/08 0275 P1/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_381814 A/Guinea fowl/South Africa/17080274/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285941 A/Guineafowl/South Africa/S2017/08 0274 P2/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369350 A/chicken/South Africa/17080561/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285607 A/Duck/South Africa/S2017/08 0340 P2/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285606 A/Duck/South Africa/S2017/08 0340 P1/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369347 A/Pekin duck/South Africa/17080340/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_365299 A/chicken/South Africa/17090108/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285651 A/Guineafowl/South Africa/S2017/08 0190 9/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369349 A/Swan/South Africa/17080517/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369348 A/Pekin duck/South Africa/17080481/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369361 A/chicken/South Africa/17090335/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285610 A/Guineafowl/South Africa/S2017/08 0274 P1/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285916 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/08 0581 P2/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369351 A/chicken/South Africa/17080581/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369346 A/chicken/South Africa/17080336/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285624 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/09 0050 56/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369357 A/chicken/South Africa/449300/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 




Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_369356 A/chicken/South Africa/17090325/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369354 A/chicken/South Africa/17090202/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369352 A/chicken/South Africa/17090050/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285652 A/Guineafowl/South Africa/S2017/08 0243 P2/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_381815 A/dove/South Africa/17080324/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_381813 A/Guinea fowl/South Africa/17080243/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_378311 A/pigeon/South Africa/17080323/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369360 A/chicken/South Africa/449443/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369353 A/chicken/South Africa/17090100/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_284004 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/08 0336 P3/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369364 A/chicken/South Africa/450628/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285623 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/08 0416 38/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369358 A/chicken/South Africa/17090348/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369365 A/chicken/South Africa/451457/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285915 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/08 0581 P1/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285655 A/Geese/South Africa/S2017/08 0558 P1/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369359 A/chicken/South Africa/449418/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285617 A/Guineafowl/South Africa/S2017/08 0243 P1/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285658 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/08 0561 P1/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285650 A/Ostrich/South Africa/S2017/08 0046 AF/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369344 A/ostrich/South Africa/17080046/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369362 A/turkey/South Africa/450199/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285649 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/09 0184 63/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285602 A/Geese/South Africa/S2017/09 0065 P2/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285918 A/Ostrich/South Africa/S2017/08 0362 P8 34/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285618 A/Ostrich/South Africa/S2017/08 0362 P7/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285608 A/Ostrich/South Africa/S2017/08 0362 P8 33/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369343 A/chicken/South Africa/441839/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369339 A/chicken/South Africa/440638A/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369340 A/chicken/South Africa/440638B/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369336 A/chicken/South Africa/Villiers/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369342 A/chicken/South Africa/MC002/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369338 A/chicken/South Africa/436893/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_381811 A/Speckled pigeon/South Africa/08-004B/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369363 A/chicken/South Africa/115370/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285653 A/Pigeon/South Africa/S2017/08 0323 P1/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285604 A/Ostrich/South Africa/S2017/08 0046 P3/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 




Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_285917 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/09 0184 62/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285625 A/Duck/South Africa/S2017/08 0481 P2/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285944 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/08 0336 P2/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285480 A/Ostrich/South Africa/S2017/08 0362 P10/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285512 A/Chicken/South Africa/S2017/08 0336 P1/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_285616 A/Ostrich/South Africa/S2017/08 0161 P8/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_369345 A/chicken/South Africa/443397/2017 National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
EPI_ISL_237554 A/painted stork/India/10CA03/2016 ICAR-National Institute of High Security Animal Diseases 
EPI_ISL_240677 A/domestic duck/Siberia/103/2016 Research Institute of Experimental and Clinical Medicine 
EPI_ISL_250231 A/domestic duck/Siberia/49 feather/2016 Research Institute of Experimental and Clinical Medicine 
EPI_ISL_240678 A/domestic duck/Siberia/50K/2016 Research Institute of Experimental and Clinical Medicine 
EPI_ISL_297466 A/chicken/Kostroma/1721/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_297465 A/chicken/Kostroma/1720/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_297464 A/chicken/Kostroma/1719/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_297463 A/chicken/Kostroma/1717/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_295027 A/chicken/Kostroma/1718/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_254745 A/mallard duck/Korea/WA137/2017 Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency (S-2026) 
EPI_ISL_254725 A/chicken/Korea/H903/2017 Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency (S-2026) 
EPI_ISL_292498 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a210/2017 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292479 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a893/2017 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292478 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a765/2017 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292477 A/Great Crested Grebe/Qinghai/a737/2017 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292476 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a237/2017 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292335 A/water/Qinghai/XXII2871/2017 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292334 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/B655/2017 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292341 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a218/2017 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292340 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a230/2017 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_306958 A/Ornamental bird/Al-Qasim/AI9/2017 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_306956 A/Falcon/Riyadh/AI5/2017 Center of Influenza Research, University of Hong Kong 
EPI_ISL_306955 A/Bulbul/Riyadh/AI4/2017 Center of Influenza Research, University of Hong Kong 
EPI_ISL_306915 A/Chicken/Riyadh/A15/2018 Center of Influenza Research, University of Hong Kong 
EPI_ISL_306912 A/Chicken/Riyadh/AI6/2017 Center of Influenza Research, University of Hong Kong 
EPI_ISL_306910 A/Turkey/Riyadh/AI1/2017 Center of Influenza Research, University of Hong Kong 
EPI_ISL_306914 A/Chicken/Riyadh/AI10/2017 Center of Influenza Research, University of Hong Kong 
EPI_ISL_306959 A/Holland pigeon/Riyadh/AI3/2017 Center of Influenza Research, University of Hong Kong 
EPI_ISL_306957 A/Chicken/Al-Ahsaa/AI8/2017 Center of Influenza Research, University of Hong Kong 
EPI_ISL_306913 A/Chicken/Al-Ahsaa/AI7/2017 Center of Influenza Research, University of Hong Kong 




Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_306911 A/Duck/Riyadh/AI2/2017 Center of Influenza Research, University of Hong Kong 
EPI_ISL_231685 A/black-headed gull/Tyva/41/2016 WHO National Influenza Centre Russian Federation 
EPI_ISL_231684 A/wild duck/Tyva/35/2016 WHO National Influenza Centre Russian Federation 
EPI_ISL_230820 A/great crested grebe/Tyva/34/2016 WHO National Influenza Centre Russian Federation 
EPI_ISL_240109 A/chicken/Kalmykia/2661/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_248666 A/bronze turkey/Czech Republic/1414-17/2017 State Veterinary Institute Prague 
EPI_ISL_247724 A/wild duck/Tatarstan/3059/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_297234 A/chicken/Rostov-on-Don/1321/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_237965 A/goose/Hungary/55128/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_239069 A/mute swan/Croatia/85/2016 Croatian Veterinary Institute 
EPI_ISL_237731 A/domestic turkey/Hungary/53433/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_256460 A/Turkey/Hungary/53136/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_238197 A/mute swan/Croatia/78/2016 Croatian Veterinary Institute 
EPI_ISL_255193 A/Duck/Hungary/984/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_378256 A/Mulard Duck/Hungary/59163/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_271714 A/Mulard duck/Hungary/59163/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255935 A/Mute swan/Hungary/6276/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_239420 A/duck/Hungary/60441/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_271711 A/Mulard duck/Hungary/62902/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_271710 A/Mulard duck/Hungary/60369/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_271708 A/Goose/Hungary/17985/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_271706 A/Goose/Hungary/17051/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_271705 A/Goose/Hungary/15729/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_271704 A/Goose/Hungary/17261/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_256453 A/Duck/Hungary/54738/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255191 A/Harris Hawk/Hungary/120/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_237964 A/Mulard duck/Hungary/54494/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_271713 A/Goose/Hungary/64909/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_271712 A/Goose/Hungary/63743/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_271709 A/Goose/Hungary/59763/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_271707 A/Goose/Hungary/17580/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255937 A/Pheasant/Hungary/7685/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255936 A/Pheasant/Hungary/6553/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_237966 A/duck/Hungary/55191/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_239419 A/chicken/Hungary/59048/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255938 A/Rook/Hungary/4975/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_256457 A/Duck/Hungary/55764/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 




Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_255398 A/Goose/Hungary/59712/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_237730 A/mute swan/Hungary/51049/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255212 A/Greylag goose/Hungary/320/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255220 A/Mallard/Hungary/1574a/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255218 A/Mallard/Hungary/1574b/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_297235 A/chicken/Rostov-on-Don/1598/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_268652 A/Eur Wig/NL-Zoeterwoude/16015702-010/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268645 A/Eur Wig/NL-Leidschendam/16015697-007/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268641 A/Eur Wig/NL-Gouda/16015824-001/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268637 A/Eur Wig/NL-De Waal (Texel)/16014891-004/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268636 A/Eur Wig/NL-De Waal (Texel)/16014891-003/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268657 A/Grey Go/NL-Groot-Ammers/16015901-012/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268653 A/Eur Wig/NL-Zwolle/16015820-002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268626 A/Ch/NL-Rhenen/16016141-006/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268650 A/Eur Wig/NL-West Graftdijk/16015746-003/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268648 A/Eur Wig/NL-Vianen/16015917-006/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268646 A/Eur Wig/NL-Reeuwijk/16015903-003/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268632 A/Dk/NL-Kamperveen/16016104-001-005/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_239801 A/turkey/England/052131/2016 Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) 
EPI_ISL_268627 A/Ch/NL-Zoeterwoude/16016484-021-025/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268623 A/Ch/NL-Boven Leeuwen/16016151-006-010/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268642 A/Eur Wig/NL-Greonterp/16015653-001/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_275287 A/chicken/Rostov-on-Don/44/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_247723 A/mute swan/Krasnodar/25/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_268651 A/Eur Wig/NL-Wormer/16016143-002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268649 A/Eur Wig/NL-Walterswald/16015923-003/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268638 A/Eur Wig/NL-Drieborg (Dollard)/16015513-001/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_339105 A/Duck/France/RG1/2016 (H5N8) Ecole Veterinaire de Toulouse 
EPI_ISL_255934 A/Mute swan/Hungary/6092/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255200 A/Mute swan/Hungary/2508/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_224580 A/great crested grebe/Uvs-Nuur Lake/341/2016 Research Institute of Experimental and Clinical Medicine 
EPI_ISL_268625 A/Ch/NL-Hiaure/16016112-001-005/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_333615 A/gadwall/Chany/893/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_287564 A/T Dk/NL-Werkendam/16014159-001/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268672 A/T Dk/NL-Werkendam/16014159-002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268671 A/T Dk/NL-Rotterdam/16014155-001/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268670 A/T Dk/NL-Roggebotsluis/16014462-015/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 




Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_268669 A/T Dk/NL-Monnickendam/16013865-006-008/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268666 A/P falcon/NL-Vrouwenpolder (Zeeland)/16015510-001/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268660 A/Gull10/NL-Marker Wadden/16014466-014/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268659 A/Gull1/NL-Marker Wadden/16014466-011/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268658 A/Gull/NL-Marker Wadden/16014466-020/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268656 A/Gr bk bd gull/NL-Slootdorp/16014102-005/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268655 A/Go/NL-Roggebotsluis/16014462-010/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268654 A/G c grebe/NL-Monnickendam/16013865-009-010/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268633 A/Dk/NL-Rotterdam/16014008-001-005/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268624 A/Ch/NL-Den Oever/16014231-001/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268621 A/C Gull/NL-Slootdorp/16014102-003/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268619 A/Bl H gull/NL-Slootdorp/16014102-002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_274858 A/mute swan/Kaliningrad/132/2017 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268678 A/T Dk/NL-Zeewolde/16013976-005/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268677 A/T Dk/NL-Zeewolde/16013976-004-006/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268665 A/Mal/NL-Mastenbroek/16015378-002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268639 A/Eur Wig/NL-Enumatil-Groningen/16015704-001/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268643 A/Eur Wig/NL-Groningen/16015376-003/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268663 A/Magpie/NL-Volendam/16014331-002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268661 A/L-bl-ba-gull/NL-Sovon/16014324-014/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268620 A/Buzzard/NL-Durgerdam/16015100-004/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268628 A/Crow/NL-Oostwoud/16015372-004/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268662 A/M Swan/NL-Roggebotsluis/16014462-019/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_255209 A/Common tern/Hungary/8187/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_268681 A/T Dk/NL-Zuidoost Beemster/16014148-009/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268680 A/T Dk/NL-Zuidoost Beemster/16014148-002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268668 A/T Dk/NL-Almeerder Zand/16014341-003/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268679 A/T Dk/NL-Zeewolde/16013976-006/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268676 A/T Dk/NL-Zeewolde/16013976-004/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268675 A/T Dk/NL-Zeewolde/16013976-001-003/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268674 A/T Dk/NL-Zeewolde/16013976-001/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268673 A/T Dk/NL-Werkendam/16014159-003/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268618 A/Bk swan/NL-Den Oever/16013973-002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_255910 A/Mew Gull/Netherlands/1/2016 Erasmus Medical Center 
EPI_ISL_268631 A/Dk/NL-Biddinghuizen/16015145-021-025/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268630 A/Dk/NL-Biddinghuizen/16015083-016-020/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268629 A/Dk/NL-Biddinghuizen/16014829-011-015/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 




Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_268644 A/Eur Wig/NL-Leeuwarden/16015699-002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268682 A/Teal/NL-Ferwert/16015273-013/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_288363 A/chicken/Greece/39 2017a/2017 Thessalonica Veterinary Centre 
EPI_ISL_288362 A/chicken/Greece/39 2017/2017 Thessalonica Veterinary Centre 
EPI_ISL_256298 A/gadwall/Kurgan/2442/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_247725 A/chicken/Kalmykia/2643/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_247720 A/chicken/Voronezh/20/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_247719 A/chicken/Voronezh/19/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_247718 A/chicken/Voronezh/18/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_247717 A/long-eared owl/Voronezh/16/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_247716 A/Ural owl/Voronezh/14/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_247715 A/long-eared owl/Voronezh/15/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_282143 A/goose/Italy/17VIR6358-3/2017 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale Delle Venezie 
EPI_ISL_282141 A/swan/Italy/17VIR7064-1/2017 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale Delle Venezie 
EPI_ISL_247722 A/goose/Krasnodar/3144/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_255206 A/Peregrine falcon/Hungary/4882/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_335457 A/mute swan/Shimane/3211A002/2017 National Institute of Animal Health 
EPI_ISL_268667 A/Sea eagle/NL-Assen/16015398-002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_267376 A/mallard duck/Netherlands/18/2012 Erasmus Medical Center 
EPI_ISL_373081 A/Mallard/Netherlands/21/2013 Erasmus Medical Center 
EPI_ISL_267224 A/mallard duck/Netherlands/16/2012 Erasmus Medical Center 
EPI_ISL_267243 A/barnacle goose/Netherlands/2/2014 Erasmus Medical Center 
EPI_ISL_243650 A/mallard duck/Netherlands/24/2009 Erasmus Medical Center 
EPI_ISL_309840 A/Chicken/Netherlands/12002495-006-010/2012 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_309930 A/Chicken/Netherlands/14016059/2014 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_309835 A/Duck/Netherlands/14016396/2014 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_309833 A/Duck/Netherlands/14015610/2014 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_332682 A/teal/Toguchin/1157/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_332681 A/teal/Toguchin/1156/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_332679 A/mallard/Toguchin/1154/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_332677 A/teal/Toguchin/1153/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_237553 A/duck/India/10CA01/2016 ICAR-National Institute of High Security Animal Diseases 
EPI_ISL_292194 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a88/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292331 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a114/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_266820 A/Bean goose/Hubei/CH-i122/2017 H5N8 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_266824 A/Bean goose/Hubei/CH-i320/2017 H5N8 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_266821 A/Bean goose/Hubei/CH-i119/2017 Wuhan Institute of Virology 




Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_240110 A/chicken/Astrakhan/3131/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_255219 A/White fronted goose/Hungary/801/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255215 A/Mute swan/Hungary/3137/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255213 A/GuineaFowl/Hungary/596/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255202 A/Mute swan/Hungary/3139/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255196 A/Greylag goose/Hungary/1941/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_275433 A/unknown/Tatarstan/94/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_275288 A/chicken/Tatarstan/88/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_275283 A/chicken/Shchyolkovo/47/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_256300 A/chicken/Sergiyev Posad/39/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_256299 A/chicken/Sergiyev Posad/38/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_275432 A/unknown/Tatarstan/86/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_322984 A/Grey seal/361-10/BalticPL/16 Stiftung Tierärztliche Hochschule Hannover 
EPI_ISL_257699 A/Tufted Duck/Switzerland/V237/2016 Faculty of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Bern 
EPI_ISL_240012 A/duck/France/161108h/2016 Agence Nationale De Securite Sanitaire De L’alimentation 
EPI_ISL_255933 A/Cormorant/Hungary/6102/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_256462 A/Mute swan/Hungary/5879/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_288411 A/Go/NL-Utrecht/17006881-001/2017 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_287565 A/M Swan/NL-Groningen/16015826-001/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_337151 A/chicken/Mari El/870/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_320955 A/chicken/Cheboksary/851/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_320954 A/chicken/Cheboksary/850/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_320953 A/chicken/Cheboksary/849/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_320685 A/chicken/Samara/679/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_320684 A/goose/Samara/675/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_320683 A/goose/Samara/673/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_320682 A/chicken/Kursk/762/2018 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_288439 A/chicken/Korea/Gimje2/2017 Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency (S-2145) 
EPI_ISL_292187 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/XX782/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292170 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/A22/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292495 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/B11/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292181 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/A19/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292179 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/XX13/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292332 A/water/Qinghai/i34-39/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292175 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/XX446/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_266822 A/Herring Gull/Hubei/CH-i149/2017 H5N8 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292333 A/Water/Qinghai/i40-44/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 




Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_255214 A/Chicken/Hungary/1751/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_254814 A/mallard/Hungary/57857/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255216 A/Mallard/Hungary/5821/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255192 A/Goose/Hungary/982/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255198 A/Turkey/Hungary/2030/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255190 A/Mute swan/Hungary/119/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255195 A/Duck/Hungary/1588/2017 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_255174 A/Goose/Hungary/65817/2016 Central Agricultural Office Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate 
EPI_ISL_247721 A/turkey/Rostov-on-Don/11/2017 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_268622 A/Ch/NL-Abbega/X16015736/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_268664 A/Mal/NL-IJsselmuiden/16015448-002/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_253036 A/turkey/England/003778/2017 Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) 
EPI_ISL_253037 A/chicken/Wales/000023/2016 Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) 
EPI_ISL_268634 A/Dk/NL-Stolwijk/16016291-016-020/2016 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research 
EPI_ISL_255182 A/turkey/Italy/17VIR538-1/2017 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale Delle Venezie 
EPI_ISL_288438 A/chicken/Korea/Gunsan/2017 Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency (S-2145) 
EPI_ISL_333629 A/Environment/Fujiansanyuan/08/2017 Fujian Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
EPI_ISL_256301 A/environment/Kamchatka/18/2016 State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR 
EPI_ISL_292326 A/Great Cormorant/Qinghai/a51/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292192 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/A23/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292191 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/B12/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292188 A/Great Cormorant/Qinghai/B82/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224744 A/Brown-headed Gull/Qinghai/ZTO3-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224743 A/Brown-headed Gull/Qinghai/ZTO1-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224734 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY15-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224726 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY11-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224717 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY7-LU1/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_288364 A/chicken/Greece/39 2017b/2017 Thessalonica Veterinary Centre (TVC) 
EPI_ISL_292497 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/XXI122/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292330 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a26/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292327 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/p2/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292237 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a15/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292231 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a61/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292190 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/XX111/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292180 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/XX22/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224729 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY13-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224715 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY6-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 




Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_292229 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a113/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292184 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/B51/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292174 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/XX431/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292176 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/A17/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292235 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a43/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292232 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/HDT001/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292178 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/A12/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224751 A/Brown-headed Gull/Qinghai/ZTO6-MU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224746 A/Brown-headed Gull/Qinghai/ZTO4-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224733 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY15-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224731 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY14-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224730 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY13-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224716 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY7-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224725 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY11-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224735 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY16-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224742 A/Brown-headed Gull/Qinghai/ZTO1-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_291952 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/B44/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292183 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/A13/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292328 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a45/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292329 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a27/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292236 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a24/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292193 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/XX76/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224724 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY10-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224714 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY6-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224707 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY2-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224708 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY2-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292230 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a93/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224745 A/Brown-headed Gull/Qinghai/ZTO3-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224750 A/Brown-headed Gull/Qinghai/ZTO6-SP/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224749 A/Brown-headed Gull/Qinghai/ZTO6-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224736 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY16-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224741 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY18-MU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224732 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY14-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224740 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY18-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224739 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY18-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224723 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY10-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292177 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/A20/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 




Isolate ID Isolate Name Submitting Lab 
EPI_ISL_292182 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/A16/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292185 A/Great Cormorant/Qinghai/Y01/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224718 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY7-LU2/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224747 A/Brown-headed Gull/Qinghai/ZTO5-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224728 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY12-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224727 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY12-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292238 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/p18/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292233 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a91/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292173 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/B54/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224720 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY8-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224719 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY8-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224712 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY4-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224704 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY1-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224748 A/Brown-headed Gull/Qinghai/ZTO5-K/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224721 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY9-B/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_224722 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/BTY9-LU/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292496 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/A11/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_292198 A/Bar-headed Goose/Qinghai/a115/2016 Wuhan Institute of Virology 
EPI_ISL_404993 A/white-fronted Goose/Germany-BB/AI00018/2020 Friedrich-Loeffler-Institute 
EPI_ISL_410291 A/chicken/Germany-BW/AI00049/2020 Friedrich-Loeffler-Institute 
EPI_ISL_405813 A/hawk/Poland/003/2020 National Veterinary Research Institut Poland 
EPI_ISL_402134 A/turkey/Poland/23/2019 National Veterinary Research Institut Poland 
EPI_ISL_405391 A/chicken/Czech Republic/1175-1/2020 State Veterinary Institute Prague 
EPI_ISL_405278 A/guinea fowl/Nigeria/OG-GF11T 19VIR8424-7/2019 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale Delle Venezie 
 
  





4. Publication IV: Novel Reassortant Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N2) Virus in 
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GISAID Sequence Accession No. 
PB2 PB1 PA HA NP NA M NS 
A/Chicken/Egypt/Al00994/2019 H5N2 EPI1420452 EPI1420451 EPI1420416 EPI14204383 EPI1420434 EPI1420450 EPI1420384 EPI1420397 
A/Duck/Egypt/AR518/2017 H5N8 EPI1420351 EPI1420350 EPI1420349 EPI1381391 EPI1420346 EPI1420345 EPI1420344 EPI1420347 
A/Duck/Egypt/AR560/2018 H5N8 EPI1420334 EPI1420333 EPI1420332 EPI1381402 EPI1420330 EPI1420329 EPI1420328 EPI1420331 
A/Turkey/Egypt/AR550/2018 H5N8 EPI1420343 EPI1420342 EPI1420341 EPI1381395 EPI1420339 EPI1420338 EPI1420336 EPI1420340 
A/Duck/Egypt/AR526/2017 H5N1 EPI1420366 EPI1420364 EPI1420363 EPI1381393 EPI1420358 EPI1420357 EPI1420355 EPI1420362 
A/Chicken/Egypt/AR528/2017 H5N1 EPI1420377 EPI1420376 EPI1420375 EPI1381432 EPI1420372 EPI14203571 EPI1420369 EPI1420373 
A/Chicken/Egypt/AR544/2018 H9N2 EPI1420308 EPI1420307 EPI1420306 EPI1381412 EPI1420304 EPI1381411 EPI142035301 EPI1420305 
A/Chicken/Egypt/AR545/2018 H9N2 EPI1420327 EPI1420326 EPI1420325 EPI131413 EPI1420323 EPI14203322 EPI1420321 EPI1420324 
A/Chicken/Egypt/AR546/2018 H9N2 EPI1420318 EPI1420317 EPI1420316 EPI1381414 EPI1420314 EPI1420313 EPI1420312 EPI1420315 
A/Chicken/Egypt/AI00986/2019 H5N2    EPI1542792     
A/Chicken/Egypt/AI00987/2019 H5, H9, N2    EPI1542793     
A/Chicken/Egypt/AI00988/2019 H5, H9, N2    EPI1542794     
A/Chicken/Egypt/AI00989/2019 H5, H9, N2    EPI1542795     
A/Chicken/Egypt/AI00990/2019 H5, H9, N2    EPI1542796     
A/Chicken/Egypt/AI00992/2019 H5N2    EPI1542798     
*Bold text indicates the hemagglutinin subtype sequenced in samples in which >1 HA subtype was detected. AIV, Avian influenza virus; HA, hemagglutinin, M, matrix; NA, neuraminidase; NP, nucleoprotein; NSP, non-
structural protein; PA, polymerase; PB, polymerase basic.  
 
  










































































Appendix Figure. Phylogenetic analysis of segments of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and 
low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI). Sequence analysis was based on alignment analyses by 
MAFFTv7.450 embedded in the Geneious software suite, version 11.1.7 (https://www.geneious.com) 
with manual editing. We performed maximum likelihood calculations using PhyML version 3.0 
(http://www.atgc-montpellier.fr/phyml), we chose the best-fit model according to the Bayesian 
selection criterion using Model Finder embedded in the Geneious software suite, version 11.1.7, 
https://www.geneious.com). Colours indicate grouping of segment origin according to phylogenetic 
analyses: highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 2.2.1.2 from Egypt (cyan); H9N2 
subtype from Egypt circulating in chickens since 2010 (grey); H9N2 subtype from Egypt first detected 
in pigeons in 2014 (red); PB2 segment most closely related to an H3N6 virus from Bangladesh (purple); 
PB1 segment most closely related to an H7N7 virus from Georgia (blue); segments most closely related 
to H5N8 viruses from China (orange) or Russia (green). Acknowledgments for sequences shared via 
EpiFluTM are given in Appendix Table 2. A) Polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2) of HPAI H5N8, H5N1, and 
reassortant H5N2, and LPAI H9N2. B) Polymerase basic protein 1 (PB1) of HPAI H5N8, H5N1, and 
reassortant H5N2 and LPAI H9N2. C) Polymerase acidic protein (PA) of HPAI H5N8, H5N1, and 
reassortant H5N2, and LPAI H9N2. E) Hemagglutinin (HA _9) of LPAI H9N2. F) Nucleoprotein (NP) of 
HPAI H5N8, H5N1, and reassortant H5N2, and LPAI H9N2. G) Neuraminidase protein (NA_2) of HPAI 
reassortant H5N2 and LPAI H9N2. H) Neuraminidase protein (NA_8) of HPAI H5N8. I) Matrix protein 
(M) of HPAI H5N8, H5N1, and reassortant H5N2, and LPAI H9N2. J) Non-structural protein (NS) of HPAI 





















V. D ISCUSSION  
Over the past decade, four major human pandemics and numerous sporadic and enzootic outbreaks 
caused by IAV have affected the (veterinary) public health sector and instigated vast (economic) losses 
in the livestock industry and wild bird population. The rapid evolution and subsequent constant 
emergence of novel (zoonotic) IAV strains alongside the worldwide spread of the gs/GD HPAIV H5 
lineage calls for dedicated AIV surveillance to allow timely detection and expedient prevention. Whole-
genome evaluation by second-generation sequencing (SGS) or third-generation sequencing (TGS) has 
become the gold standard for surveillance studies and outbreak investigations, attributable to the 
expedited identification of all harboured IAV segments. This permits precise genetic characterisation 
and additional in-depth analysis of the outbreak dynamics. As curtailing of novel pandemic threats is 
believed to be best achieved by effectively controlling AIV in poultry, exact understanding of outbreak 
scenarios by phylogenetic analysis can aid in the establishment of viable prevention measures.  
Therefore, this thesis aims to portray the possibilities and importance of rapid, real-time, and 
accessible WGS as the foundation for quick detection of novel IAV strains and advanced, in-depth 
genetic analysis and molecular epidemiology studies. In addition, insights into outbreak scenarios can 
permit improved prevention to evade novel epidemic or even pandemic threats.  
 
Objective I:   Establishment and application of a rapid, real-time MinION nanopore sequencing 
workflow for IAV  
Publication I, III 
Due to the mutable nature of IAV, the application of WGS in the clinical setting, in outbreak scenarios 
and in surveillance studies is indispensable. Although high-throughput second-generation sequencers 
have drastically improved the time, cost and quality factor involved in full genome evaluation, further 
advancements are required to enable universal employment of WGS. The recent TGS movement has 
started to fill this gap, portrayed here by the described MinION nanopore sequencing workflow for 
IAV: A rapid, real-time, long-read, multiplexing protocol suited for all types of (clinical and low yield) 
IAV samples (Publication I).  
Comparison of high quality IonTorrent and lesser quality MinION reads of identical samples 
demonstrated consensus identity levels of >99.9%. Although the quality of ONT reads is lacking, 
sufficient coverage depth can almost fully minimise consensus errors with most divergences in 
homopolymer regions. The upstream IAV-End-real-time (RT)-PCR aids in the production of less data by 
minimal host share and high viral proportion while permitting WGS of low yield samples. This, 
alongside the application of a rapid transposase-based multiplexing kit, enables significant cost and 





IAV samples, crucial for clinical and outbreak scenarios to aid in disease prevention and control, as 
demonstrated in Publication III.  
PCR-free sequencing of IAV on the MinION platform has been previously conducted, utilising a 
metagenomic (135) or direct RNA approach (136). The potential bias introduced by PCR has been 
thoroughly investigated in previous studies (137-141). Metagenomic sequencing permits the detection 
of not only IAV, but also other, potentially novel pathogens. The respective study struggled with full 
genome coverage of low yield samples, and far larger datasets were needed to assemble whole 
genome sequences with adequate coverage (135). Likewise, direct RNA sequencing of IAV permitted 
the avoidance of a upstream PCR with promising results, however, the high error rate of the available 
ONT Direct RNA Sequencing Kit and need for high titre IAV isolates to achieve full genome coverage 
makes its application unsuitable for clinical and outbreak samples (136). For rapid and inexpensive 
MinION IAV WGS, inclusion of the universal IAV-End-RT-PCR permits the production of smaller datasets 
with deep coverage, thus drastically reducing costs and time consumption.  
Further reduction of expenditures can be achieved by multiplexing. The Rapid Barcoding Kit by ONT 
can sequence up to 12 samples at once. For SGS, multiplexing is a standard procedure and incorrect 
assignment of barcodes seldom. Due to the high error rate of ONT reads the process of demultiplexing 
can be negatively affected, resulting in “misindexed” reads. On average, 0.056% of total MinION reads 
are assigned to the incorrect barcode (142). For metagenomic studies, this value can obscure final 
consensus production. Combination with the prior IAV-End-RT-PCR evades this problem by 
amplification of the viral nucleic acid, thus the fraction of misindexed reads has a negligible impact on 
consensus construction.   
The suitability of MinION sequencing for field surveillance has previously been demonstrated for swIAV 
(71) and EBOV (73, 74). This highlights the potential for universal employment of ONT sequencing. 
Alike the findings in Publication I, comparable results in consensus similarities and low hands-on-time 
were described. The overall low capital cost, small footprint and lack of maintenance expenses makes 
the MinION device ideal for on-site sequencing and pushes WGS to become an integral part of many 
laboratories.  
Bioinformatics play a major role in WGS. The high error profile of TGS calls for specifically adapted 
workflows to handle TGS data (66, 143). Basecalling of raw data is where most errors occur. Here, the 
most current basecallers (e.g. Guppy by ONT) divide the raw signal into blocks termed “events”. Each 
event is translated into a “most-likely” set of bases and ideally, every event should differ by one base. 
Because the speed of DNA translocation through the nanopore is not stable, events can often not be 





not be distinguished. Seeing as correctly basecalled data forms the foundation for all following 
analyses, improvement of basecalling is of utmost importance to decrease the error rate (144-146). 
Due to the novelty of ONT, ongoing improvements of the chemistry (e.g. introduction of the dual-
headed R10 nanopore flow cell) and succeeding bioinformatic analysis, especially basecalling, will 
continue to lower the standing error profile.  
 
Objective II:  Genetic characterisation, outbreak dynamics and molecular epidemiology of clade 
2.3.4.4b HPAIV subtype H5 in Germany, 2016 – 2020 
Publication II, III 
By utilisation of WGS, dissection of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV H5 outbreak dynamics in terms of genetic 
characterisation and molecular epidemiology is possible. The unprecedented tendency for 
reassortment of the respective clade calls for full genome analysis to allow precise identification of 
novel sub- and genotypes. In-depth understanding of outbreaks allows the establishment of expedient 
preventive measures to avoid future epidemics.  
In Germany, clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV H5 strains have been abundantly reported since the first 
introduction in 2016 (17-19, 21, 22). Reassortant designation by WGS has permitted the identification 
of three subtypes (H5N8, H5N5 and H5N6) encompassing seven distinct genotypes (Ger-11-16, Ger-
12-16.1 and Ger-12-16.2, Ger-12-16-N5.1 and Ger-12-16-N5.2, Ger-12-17-N6 and Ger-01-20) to date 
(Publication II, III). Full genome evaluation together with molecular epidemiology has revealed 
different outbreak dynamics of each reassortant, comprising wild bird-mediated introduction and 
transmission, farm-to-farm poultry transmission with cluster development and reassortment within a 
poultry holding after wild bird-mediated introduction. The zoonotic potential of H5N5 and especially 
H5N6 clade 2.3.4.4b strains could be delineated in ferrets, excluding enhanced zoonotic propensity 
(Publication II).  
A major characteristic of the gs/GD lineage clade 2.3.4.4b is the frequent reassortment and advanced 
capability in attaining novel genome segments (147). In contrast, Egyptian 2.2.1.x viruses have shown 
genotypic stability for over a decade (148). Reassortment can potentially translate into advantageous 
phenotypic features for the virus affecting viral host range and fitness. Europe, including Germany, 
experienced the most severe epidemic to date during the winter of 2016/2017, driven by multiple 
HPAIV H5 reassortants (22, 149-152).  
Enabled by WGS, a clade 2.3.4.4 virus identified at the Russia-Mongolia border was uniformly detected 
as the backbone for all German clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV reassortants. Migratory birds play a central role 





breeding grounds of migratory waterfowl in Central Asia provide countless opportunities for 
transmission and reassortment and previous studies have demonstrated the potential sources and 
spread of AIV in spatio-temporal analysis of the main clade 2.3.4.4b reassortants (153, 154). For 
example, Ger-11-16, Ger-12-16 and Ger-01-20 carry different LPAIV segments detected in Central Asia. 
In line with the European study by Lycett et al. (153), the geographic distribution of the reassortants 
in Germany concurred with these findings. Distinction of reassortants by WGS allows the exact genetic 
dissection, but also enables the identification of multiple individual incursions into Germany. The most 
recent Ger-01-20 reassortant could therefore be proven a novel introduction into the country instead 
of the result of continuous local HPAIV circulation (Publication III).  
Due to reports of human influenza cases by clade 2.3.4.4c, 2.3.4.4d and, in one case, clade 2.3.4.4b 
(155), concerns about the zoonotic potential of the clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV H5N6 reassortant identified 
in Germany in 2017 (Publication III). Previous studies evaluated several clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV H5 
isolates from South Korea and the Ger-11-16 reassortant, resulting in no zoonotic propensity in ferrets 
(156-158). Frequent reassortment comes with the concomitant danger of the emergence of adapted, 
zoonotic or more pathogenic strains. Thus, continuous surveillance and virus characterisation is 
indispensable to reduce the risk of endemicity and zoonosis.  
Ongoing surveillance is of utmost importance to aid in the genetic characterisation of novel strains. 
The importance of migratory wild birds in the dissemination of AIV has been previously described and 
analysed (14). Precise dissection and establishment of relations to progeny viruses involved in the 
reassortment of new (HP)AIV can only be achieved if wide-ranging surveillance of the LPAIV wild bird 
reservoir is conducted. Thus, the identification and evaluation of reassortment events is highly 
dependent on an up-to-date AIV genome sequencing and upload to publicly available databases.  
Rapid and precise WGS of LPAIV and HPAIV is essential for the detection of novel reassortant viruses 
and their characterisation. Avoidance of enzootic virus circulation, epidemics or pandemics is greatly 
aided by genetic evaluation to allow appropriate response and prevention measures. The gs/GD H5 
lineage, especially clade 2.3.4.4b, needs continuous surveillance to reduce the risk of major outbreaks 
in the wild bird and poultry population. In addition, WGS allows in-depth understanding of outbreak 
dynamics and interactions between wild birds and poultry. This knowledge builds the foundation for 
essential biosecurity measures in commercial poultry holdings to minimise economic losses and the 








Objective III:   Surveillance for the identification and genetic characterisation of novel reasssortant 
HPAIV subtype H5 circulating in Egypt, 2019 
Publication IV 
Since the introduction of the endemic HPAIV subtype H5N1 (gs/GD lineage, clade 2.2.1) in 2006, LPAIV 
subtype H9N2 (G1 lineage) in 2011, and more recently, HPAIV subtype H5N8 (gs/GD lineage, clade 
2.3.4.4b) in 2016, the Egyptian poultry population has become entrenched with AIV (124, 134, 159). 
Co-circulation of the respective H5N1 and H9N2 viruses in Egypt so far appeared to be genotypically 
stable with no reassortment events (132). In contrast, clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5N8 viruses have shown 
high reassortment frequency in multiple outbreaks (4). Thus, the incursion of the respective HPAIV 
H5N8 strain into Egypt called for wide-ranging surveillance of the poultry population to detect 
potentially novel reassortants.  
Publication IV describes the identification of a novel H5N2 reassortant after respiratory symptoms 
were reported in multiple commercial Egyptian poultry holdings. WGS revealed the HA segment to be 
derived from clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5N8 viruses. All other segments shared the closest homology to 
LPAI H9N2 viruses circulating in chickens since 2010 or a novel reassortant H9N2 virus identified in 
pigeons in 2014.  
In Southeast Asia, natural reassortment of HPAI H5 viruses of the gs/GD lineage and LPAI H9N2 viruses 
has been reported, resulting, inter alia, in the emergence of novel H5N2 reassortants (160). The 
genotypic stability of the respective lineages despite co-circulation in Egypt saw gradual evolution by 
point mutations, but no reassortment events. Naguib et al. successfully forced virus reassortment by 
co-cultivation in embryonated chicken eggs, excluding principal incompatibility (148). The incursion of 
clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5N8 viruses beckoned an increased reassortment risk due to the previously 
observed characteristics of the respective clade, as shown by the novel H5N2 reassortant. In addition 
to the described HPAI H5N2 virus in Publication IV, a second novel H5N2 reassortant was described by 
Hagag et al. in March 2019 (161). In contrast, only the NA segment derived from endemic G1 lineage 
H9N2 viruses while all other segments had their origin in clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5N8 viruses.  
The endemic circulation of various AIV strains in Egypt has been aided by multiple factors. First, Egypt 
is located at the crossing of the East Africa/East Asia and Mediterranean/Black Sea flyway (162), 
resulting in the passing of many, potentially AIV infected, migratory birds. Second, the forms of poultry 
farming are highly diverse in Egypt, including high-density commercial farming and free-range 
backyard or rooftop rearing (163). Trading usually commences via live bird-poultry markets, presenting 
a perfect habitat for AIV (164). Third, close contact between humans and birds and the lack of 
biosecurity measures enables AIV dissemination and trans-species transmissions (27, 165). Thus, the 





Due to the endemic co-circulation of H9N2 and H5N8 viruses in Egypt, detection and surveillance by 
quantitative PCR (qPCR) may hinder the identification of the novel H5N2 reassortant. In comparison, 
active surveillance with WGS can help to detect the described H5N2 virus, whilst allowing the 
identification of other novel reassortants. The risk of transboundary spread of the novel HPAI H5N2 
virus in the Middle East and (northern) Africa could result in further reassortment events and cause 
great economic losses in the poultry production sector. Long-term solutions to stop the spread of AIV 
in Egypt by improved biosecurity measures are sorely needed, as the ongoing evolution of AIV can 
















VI. SUMMARY  
The constant evolution and pandemic potential of influenza A viruses (IAV) makes them one of the 
most complex and precarious viral pathogens globally. Alongside the impact on animal health and the 
livestock industry, some strains can carry zoonotic potential with extensive public health 
consequences. Classified depending on the host of origin, IAV are termed avian influenza viruses (AIV), 
swine influenza A viruses (swIAV), or otherwise in line with the host. Additionally, AIV are further 
divided into highly pathogenic AIV (HPAIV) or low pathogenic AIV (LPAIV) according to their level of 
pathogenicity. Characteristic for IAV is the extraordinary rate of evolution and rapid adaptation to host 
or environmental changes by point mutations, segment reassortment or, in rare cases, ribonucleic acid 
(RNA) recombination. This results in the unceasing risk of newly emerging and potentially zoonotic IAV 
strains, making rapid and continuous surveillance with full genomic evaluation of IAV indispensable.  
This thesis presents the development and validation of a rapid, multiplex and portable third-generation 
nanopore sequencing protocol for whole-genome sequencing (WGS) of IAV. In comparison to large, 
expensive and laborious second-generation sequencers, the proposed nanopore workflow allows a 
great reduction in time and cost by utilising the “size-of-a-chocolate-bar” MinION sequencer (Oxford 
Nanopore Technologies) with multiplexing and rapid, transposase-based library preparation. Only full 
genome characterisation can permit detailed understanding of outbreak dynamics and molecular 
epidemiology while aiding in rapid outbreak response and the establishment of appropriate prevention 
strategies.  
Since the emergence of the goose/Guangdong (gs/GD) lineage in 1996, specifically gs/GD clade 2.3.4.4 
HPAI H5 viruses have shown an unprecedented tendency for reassortment and high mortality among 
the wild bird population and poultry industry. Here, the application of WGS is of utmost importance to 
identify new reassortants in a timely manner. After the first introduction of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5 
viruses to Germany in 2016, three subtypes (H5N8, H5N5 and H5N6) carrying seven reassortants (Ger-
11-16, Ger-12-16.1 and Ger-12-16.2, Ger-12-16-N5.1 and Ger-12-16-N5.2, Ger-12-17-N6, and Ger-01-
20) have been identified by WGS to date. The work collected in this thesis presents studies on the 
outbreak dynamics of the major 2016/2017 HPAIV epidemic and the most recent HPAIV H5N8 
outbreak in 2020. Further, the zoonotic propensity of the circulating H5N6 and H5N5 strains was 
evaluated and genetically analysed, proving to carry very low zoonotic potential. The most recent 
incursion of a reassorted clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5N8 virus (Ger-01-20) to Germany was genetically 
characterised by the previously described third-generation nanopore sequencing protocol to achieve 
rapid whole genome and reassortment evaluation, allowing the categorisation into clade 2.3.4.4b and 





Likewise achieved by WGS, this thesis includes the detection of a novel HPAIV H5N2 strain in Egypt. 
Although the previously circulating HPAIV H5N1 and LPAIV H9N2 strains appeared genotypically stable, 
the introduction of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5N8 viruses to Egypt in 2016 resulted in the emergence of 
multiple novel reassorted HPAIV. Due to the endemic situation in Egypt and zoonotic propensity of 
particular strains, active surveillance and rapid detection is of utmost importance to aid in prevention. 
IAV will continue to evolve, mutate and reassort in the future. The role of easy and swift WGS for IAV 
surveillance, especially frequently reassorting strains like clade 2.3.4.4b, is indispensable. This thesis 
encompasses a novel IAV third-generation nanopore sequencing workflow to aid in rapid full genome 
evaluation, in-depth genetic analysis of previous clade 2.3.4.4b outbreaks in Germany allowing 
molecular epidemiology studies and insights into outbreak dynamics, and the novel detection of 
reassortment of circulating AIV strains in Egypt. The findings of this thesis can help with imminent 
















VII. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG  
Die ständige Weiterentwicklung und das pandemische Potenzial von Influenza A Viren (IAV) machen 
sie zu einem der komplexesten und gefährlichsten viralen Erreger weltweit. Neben den Auswirkungen 
auf die Tiergesundheit und die Tierhaltung können einige Stämme ein zoonotisches Potenzial mit 
weitreichenden Folgen für die öffentliche Gesundheit haben. Je nach Herkunftswirt werden die IAV als 
aviäre influenza/Vogelgrippe Viren (AIV), Schweinegrippe Viren (swIAV) oder in anderer Weise 
entsprechend dem Wirt klassifiziert. Darüber hinaus werden AIV je nach Grad ihrer Pathogenität in 
hochpathogene AIV (HPAIV) oder niedrigpathogene AIV (LPAIV) eingeteilt. Charakteristisch für IAV ist 
die hohe Evolutionsrate und schnelle Anpassung an Wirts- oder Umweltveränderungen durch 
Punktmutationen, Segment-Reassortierung oder, in seltenen Fällen, Ribonukleinsäure (RNA)-
Rekombination. Daraus ergibt sich das bestehende Risiko neu auftretender und potenziell 
zoonotischer IAV-Stämme, was eine schnelle und kontinuierliche Überwachung mit am besten 
vollständiger genomischer Erfassung und Auswertung der IAV unabdingbar macht.  
In dieser Arbeit wird die Entwicklung und Validierung eines schnellen und mobilen Nanoporen-
Sequenzierungsprotokolls für die Vollgenomsequenzierung der IAV vorgestellt. Im Vergleich zu großen, 
teuren und arbeitsintensiven Sequenziergeräten der zweiten Generation ermöglicht der 
vorgeschlagene Nanopore-Workflow durch den Einsatz des etwa 100 Gramm leichten MinION-
Sequenzers (Oxford Nanopore Technologies, ONT) mit Multiplexing und schneller, Transposasen-
basierter Sequenzierbibliothek-Vorbereitung eine große Zeit- und Kostenersparnis. Nur eine 
vollständige Genomcharakterisierung kann ein detailliertes Verständnis der Ausbruchsdynamik und 
der molekularen Epidemiologie ermöglichen und gleichzeitig zu einer schnellen Reaktion auf 
Ausbrüche und zur Etablierung geeigneter Präventionsstrategien beitragen.  
Seit dem Aufkommen der Goose/Guangdong (gs/GD) Linie im Jahr 1996 haben insbesondere HPAI H5 
Viren der gs/GD Klade 2.3.4.4 eine hohe Reassortierungstendenz einhergehend mit einer hohen 
Sterblichkeit in der Wildvogelpopulation und der Geflügelindustrie gezeigt. Hier ist die Anwendung von 
Vollgenomsequenzierung von größter Bedeutung, um neue Reassortierungen rechtzeitig zu 
identifizieren. Nach der ersten Einschleppung von HPAI H5 Viren der Klade 2.3.4.4b nach Deutschland 
im Jahr 2016 wurden durch Vollgenomsequenzierung bisher drei Subtypen (H5N8, H5N5 und H5N6) 
mit insgesamt sieben Reassortanten (Ger-11-16, Ger-12-16.1 und Ger-12-16.2, Ger-12-16-N5.1 und 
Ger-12-16-N5.2, Ger-12-17-N6 und Ger-01-20) identifiziert. Diese Promotionsarbeit stellt Studien zur 
Ausbruchsdynamik der großen HPAIV Epidemie 2016/2017 vor. Darüber hinaus wurde das zoonotische 
Potenzial der zirkulierenden H5N6- und H5N5-Stämme bewertet und genetisch analysiert, wobei sich 





eines neu reasortierten HPAI H5N8 Virus der Klade 2.3.4.4b (Ger-01-20) nach Deutschland wurde 
genetisch durch das zuvor beschriebene Nanoporen-Sequenzierungsprotokoll charakterisiert, um eine 
rasche Bewertung des Gesamtgenoms und der Reassortierung zu erreichen.   
Auch ein neuartiger HPAIV H5N2-Stamm aus Ägypten konnte mit Hilfe dieser in der Arbeit 
beschriebenen Technik vollständig genetisch charakterisiert werden. Obwohl die zuvor zirkulierenden 
HPAIV H5N1- und LPAIV H9N2-Stämme genotypisch stabil zu sein schienen, führte die Einführung von 
HPAI H5N8 Viren der Klade 2.3.4.4b nach Ägypten im Jahr 2016 zur Entstehung mehrerer neuartiger 
reassortierter HPAIV. Aufgrund der endemischen Situation in Ägypten und der zoonotischen Neigung 
bestimmter Stämme ist eine aktive Überwachung und schnelle Erkennung für die Prävention von 
größter Bedeutung. 
IAV werden sich auch in Zukunft weiterentwickeln, mutieren und reassortieren. Die Rolle der 
Vollgenomsequenzierung bei der Überwachung von IAV, insbesondere bei der häufigen 
Reassortierung von Stämmen aus der Klade 2.3.4.4b, ist unverzichtbar. Diese Arbeit umfasst einen 
neuen IAV-Arbeitsablauf zur Nanoporen-Sequenzierung der dritten Generation, der eine schnelle und 
vollständige Genomauswertung sowie eine eingehende genetische Analyse früherer und laufender 
Ausbrüche, z.B. der Klade 2.3.4.4b in Deutschland, erlaubt. Damit werden in der Folge dann auch 
retrospektive oder sehr zeitnahe molekular-epidemiologische Studien zur Ausbruchsdynamik möglich. 
Die gleiche Methodik hat schließlich auch zum Nachweis einer neuen HPAIV-H5-Reassortante in 
Ägypten geführt.  
Insgesamt könnten die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit bei bevorstehenden Ausbrüchen und der 
unerlässlichen Überwachung der IAV helfen, wodurch künftige Epidemien oder sogar Pandemien 
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IX. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL  
1. List of Abbreviations  
AIV   Avian influenza viruses 
ASIC   Application-specific Integrated Circuit 
bp   Base pairs 
cDNA   Complementary DNA 
ddNTP   Dideoxynucleosidtriphosphates  
DNA   Deoxyribonucleic acid 
EBOV   Ebola virus 
ENA   European Nucleotide Archive 
GB   Gigabytes 
GPU   Graphics processing unit 
gs/GD   Goose/Guangdong lineage 
HA   Hemagglutinin 
HACS   HA endoproteolytic cleavage site 
HIV   Human immunodeficiency viruses 
HPAIV   Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses 
IAV   Influenza A viruses 
LPAIV   Low pathogenic avian influenza viruses 
MAP   MinION Access Program 
MP   Matrix protein 
NA   Neuraminidase 
NEP   Nucleic export protein 
NGS   Next-generation sequencing 
nm   Nanometres 
NP   Nucleoprotein 
NS   Non-structural protein 
ONT   Oxford Nanopore Technologies 
PA   Polymerase acidic protein 
PacBio   Pacific Biosciences 
PB1   Polymerase basic protein 1 
PB2   Polymerase basic protein 2 
PCR   Polymerase chain reaction 





RAM   Random-access memory 
RdRP   RNA-dependent RNA polymerase 
RNA   Ribonucleic acid 
RNP   Ribonucleoprotein 
RT-PCR   Reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction 
SARS-CoV-2  Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
SGS   Second-generation sequencing 
SMRT   Single molecule real-time 
SSD   Solid-state drive 
SwIAV   Swine influenza A viruses 
TB   Terabyte 
TGS   Third-generation sequencing 
vRNA   Viral RNA 
cRNA   Complementary RNA  
WGS   Whole-genome sequencing 
 
 
2. List of Figures  
Figure 1  The MinION sequencing device and flow cell.  
Figure 2  Barcoding/multiplexing of samples.  
Figure 3 Structure of an influenza A virus particle.  
Figure 4   Antigenic drift (point mutations) and antigenic shift (reassortment), demonstrated with the 
example of the pandemic human H3N2 virus from 1968. 
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